"Do This Mean What I Think It Do?"

I borrowed this title from John Wayne’s “The Alamo” where two of the wounded character actors are facing imminent death at the hands of two soldados and the one turns to the other and says “Does this mean what I think it do?” “It do,” his comrade replies. The scene, I believe, truthfully relates to a dilemma the historian encounters when an evidence trail leads to an unanticipated and uncomfortable conclusion. There is no easy way to deal with the problem I have encountered other than to lay out the evidence and let the proverbial “chips fall where they may.”

On November 18. 1863 Col. William W. Robinson, 7^th Wisconsin, penned his after-action report of the battle of Gettysburg, and since then it has become one of the foundational accounts of the heroic stand of the I Corps on July 1, 1863. However, since then, a great many more primary accounts have surfaced through the work of renowned Iron Brigade historian, Lance Herdegen. Using those accounts and those of other participants in the action at Herbst Woods has led me to draw conclusions which question the veracity of Robinson’s report.

1.      Robinson said the 7^th Wisconsin arrived near Gettysburg about 10:00 a.m.

   His lieutenant colonel, John B. Callis in a letter to battle historian. John B. Bachelder wrote that the colonel “went to the rear” about 9:00 am. or later in the afternoon when he heard of General Solomon Meredith’s wounding. I think the evidence shows he left eh column in the morning and did not show up until after Meredith left the field.

2.      Robinson writes, “We had not halted to load, and no orders had been received to do so…I. however, gave the order to load during the movement,,,so that no time was lost by this omission.”

   At the first reunion of the 19^th Indiana in1871 at  Cambridge City, Indiana, Capt. Hollon Richardson, senior staff officer of the Iron Brigade, and Meredith’s son-in-law stated, “ By the order of Gen. Meredith, I directed the several Colonels in their order of columns to move forward into line and directed them to load as they came into line.”

(As a side note, Richardson married the colonel’s daughter secretly on May 9, 1862 which created bad blood between the two until 1864.)

   Two enlisted men in the 7^th Wisconsin clearly indicated they went into action with loaded weapons.

3.      Robinson deployed his regiment along the fence on the crest of McPherson ridge with his right flank anchored on the southeast corner of Herbst Woods while the 2^nd Wisconsin entered the woods to his right front. He said that Capt. Craig Wadsworth rode up to him from the right (north) and the colonel asked him to identify what troops ere hidden in the smoke to his front. Robinson was not sure if it was Confederates or the left of the 2^nd Wisconsin. Wadsworth pointed to a Confederate battle flag jutting above the smoke to the left front, some 200 yards away.

   Lieutenant Colonel John B. Callis and Maj. Mark Finnicum (7^th Wisconsin) both said otherwise. Callis said the regiment was moving right in front when it was his by the first volley which struck the 2^nd Wisconsin to his front. Both he and the major recalled both regiments getting hit by that fir, which knocked down a “many of our men.” (Finnicum sent a report to the governor of Wisconsin on July 24, 1863.)

   Callis was wounded slightly and his horse died in that volley. He hurriedly organized his men into line, ordered them to fix bayonets and charge. Just as they did so Wadsworth, riding in from the north, where he had left the slain Gen. John F. Reynolds, ordered them to stop but to no avail.

4.      Robinson waited for the 19^th Indiana and the 24^th Michigan to come up on his left before the regiments fired and charged.

   In Ltc. William W. Dudley’s “The Iron Brigade at Gettysburg,” (1879) the only brigade level report of the brigade in that battle stated, “The 7^th Wisconsin, and the following regiments were hurried up and, forming line of battle from line of march, launched upon the enemy without alignment, thus in effect charging en echelon.” (Dudley commanded the 19^th Indiana and lost a leg at Gettysburg.)

   This matches Richardson’s account of delivering the order to form line by taking the order from colonel to colonel and it also explains why no Confederates saw a massive Federal line to their front.

5.      Colonel Robinson said that after the brigade overran Archer’s Confederate brigade that General Meredith personally ordered his to cross to the eastern side of Willoughby Run and he fell into the brigade line. He places the 7^th Wisconsin on the right of the line with the 2^nd Wisconsin to its left.

   Dudley, the historian of the 24^th Michigan, Callis and Sgt. Cornelius Wheeler (2^nd Wisconsin) places the brigade order from south to north as: 19^th Indiana, 24^th Michigan, 7^th Wisconsin, 2^nd Wisconsin, with the 2^nd facing north, inside the wood line, at a right angle to the 7^th Wisconsin.

6.      At the time of the 3:00 p.m. attack of Heth’s Division against Herbst Woods, Robinson asserts, “Captain Richardson brought me the order to retire to Seminary Ridge. I retired by the right of companies to the rear…”

   Major Finnicum in his July 24 letter to the governor penned. “At this time a staff officer came to Col. Robinson, with orders to fall back with the 7^th Regt. and form a new line of battle.”

   Richardson confirms this in part. After witnessing Dudley’s and Genera; Meredith’s wounding, “I had but time to say God bless and preserve you, when I dashed on to make our third stand. After giving the enemy a good round volley we moved back by right of company to the rear.” He further says the regiment turned about three times in retreat to deliver shots at the enemy.

   John B. Callis confirms this but adds, “This was about 3 o’clock in the afternoon when I received a line from Gen. Meredith saying, ‘I am hurt and cannot get to you, take command of the brigade and get out of that little end of a V as best you can.” He proceeded to order the regiment to retreat by “right of companies to the rear,” and., as noted by Richardson, fell back to face about and return fired several times.

   If Richardson was senior officer, he should have gotten brigade command but he did not, according to his own report, get command until later in the evening when what was left of the brigade reached Cemetery Hill.

   On July 14, 1863, the brigade’s division commander, General James Wadsworth, wrote Governor Alexander W. Randall (Wisconsin), the following: In the battle of Gettysburg, as senior staff officer of the Brigade, a large and unusual amount of responsibility devolved upon him [Hollon Richardson], amounting at times to the command of the brigade. His conduct on this as on other occasions of severe trial, was in highest degree meritorious.”

   It is interesting to note that 10 days later Major Finnicum, and not acting brigade commander, Colonel Robinson, wrote a letter to the governor in which he cites Robinson as being on the field at the commencement of the retreat and mentions the wounding of John B. Callis. (Finnicum fought in the ranks of Company E like an enlisted man and was not behind the regiment as he should have been. No apparent command control existed in the brigade at this time.)

   On August 13, 1863 General Lysander Cutler, commanding the 2^nd Brigade, Wadsworth’s brigade, wrote to former governor Edward Solomon, “Sir: I desire to recommend to your especial consideration, Captain Hollon Richardson, of the 7^th Wisconsin Volunteers…”on the bloody field of Gettysburg, where he manifested the utmost coolness and bravery , entitle him to the especial consideration of the Executive of the State he has so much honored. At Gettysburg he virtually commanded the brigade for a portion of the day. It cannot be known how many lives he saved by the manner in which he brought off the troops from that field…when there seemed to be no one else to give orders, most of the field officers having been killed or wounded.”

   It is interesting that Cutler felt compelled to write the former governor (presumably to tell the current governor) to reinforce what his division commander had already stated.

   Callis, who was on foot and in full retreat with his men never had the opportunity to command the brigade. He was shot down while trying to get the Federal artillery from shredding their own line with canister.

7.      Robinson’s account of the retreat through town is very accurate. He apparently came upon what was left of the regiment at the rail barricade in the low ground west of Seminary Ridge. Finnicum said he came upon seven of the regiment’s companies where the colonel had rallied the men in “Splendid style.”

8.      Robinson interestingly writes that during the retreat from the Seminary to the town, I met with the heaviest losses from the regiment during the day.” Had he been on the field during the first volley and during the retreat through Herbst Woods, he would not have written that. It was the largest number of losses sustained while he was with the regiment. Conclusion: Robinson wrote his report based upon the testimony of the few officers and men who survived the morning and early afternoon fight. He was not with the regiment until it retired to Seminary Ridge. I do not know why he was not with the regiment or the brigade until that time, I can only suppose that he had fallen ill in the excessive heat and humidity. He was not a coward by any means but he was not a witness to the fight until the retreat through town.