Random Thoughts

My apologies for the delay in getting another blog out, but I have been very busy going to the doctor, reading books to review for Civil War News, further tweaking Chaos, Confusion, and Casualties, doing research for and writing my newest project, and generally slacking off to “think.” My mind seldom slows down and it literally drives me nuts. Writing tends to slow me down to reflect on what I have to say.

I am reading a very good book right now about the U.S. Civil War did or did not influence the British military prior to the Boer War. Until I encountered this work, I never realized how different our land forces appeared to the Europeans, in particular, the British. The general consensus considered the American forces on both sides of the conflict as amateurs, in particular, the cavalry. The British officers likened them to Yeoman cavalry, as opposed to genuine “horsemen,” who, when given the opportunity, preferred fighting dismounted with rifles or carbines, rather than with sabres and lances. It reminds me of an “Indiana Jones” movie where he shot his opponent rather than use his bullwhip on him.

It is a fair observation. U.S. drill manuals at the time instructed the trooper how to fight dismounted and how to load a revolver while mounted. They also had sabre drill. George Armstrong Custer and J. E. B. Stuart, as late as 1864, in the Wilderness and on the way to Spotsylvania still used sabre charges in preference to dismounted engagements, much to the chagrin of their men. Wade Hampton, however, during the same campaign, generally deployed in skirmish order. The British, while allowing native and Yeoman regiments engage as mounted infantry, seems to have stubbornly clung to the image of superb horsemen, well-aligned, and highly disciplined dashing in on the fleeing enemy to with blades flashing in the sunlight.

Britain, because of its empire, had to have a professional army, something which, at the time, the Americans feared and actually held in some disdain. It is similar to the pre-World War II image of a service man being someone who could not get a job in civilian life. I say that with the caveat that popular perception does not necessarily reflect reality.

The problem with amateurs is that they do not always play by the rules – if they even know what they are. Ever since the American War for Independence (and before), Americans have clung to the myth that a professional army is not required when an armed populace of free men, who also are crack shots, (thanks to James Fennimore Cooper), enter the conflict.

My personal opinion, and that is all that it is, is that a country established by rebellion will often produce independent thinking, freedom loving individualists. I cannot prove it. I cannot easily document it.  However, I believe our military has historically reflected that very principal. During the first year of the Civil War a large number of units elected their company and regimental officers. I have seen some evidence of Hampton Legion doing that as late as 1864. Private Shugan Snow (Company I) became the new captain, then commanding officer of the company sized 12^th North Carolina a short time before the Battle of Fox’s Gap on September 14, 1862. In the Army of Northern Virginia enlisted men were known to touch speak to their regimental officers without asking permission first, something not allowed in the Army of the Potomac.  

The British correctly observed that the greater part of the American armies in “The War” were, indeed, amateurs as opposed to professionals in the European sense of the terms. The Western armies, in particular, turned out being less “spit and polish, than their Eastern counterparts. They brought the war home to the Deep South as did Sheridan’s cavalry to the Shenandoah Valley. The war converted both amateur armies into hardened veterans as do all wars.

The other thing running through my mind is how important the minutiae in historical records really matter in interpreting a particular event. I am trying to piece together one of the most complicated events I have ever researched: July 1, 1863 at Gettysburg. It is like trying to reconstruct a massive puzzle which someone has thrown on the floor where none of the pieces are cut alike. The moment I think I understand what transpired, the more I realize that seemingly unreconcilable account intervene to muddle the picture more.

The two hour morning engagement west of the town consists of around four interconnected yet isolated actions. It is every bit as confusing and as complicated as the Morning Phase of the Cornfield at Antietam nine months earlier. I am exploring a number of glitches in the  general interpretation of the fighting which I have to resolve or clarify which take a great deal of time to explain. Lieutenant Calef’s U.S. Regular battery appears to have lost one of Sgt. Pergel’s guns to Confederate artillery fire during Archer’s attack against Herbst Woods. The 14^th Brooklyn did not strike the western railroad cut as commonly shown. James A. Hall’s battery left three guns, not one, on the field which explains why the infantry attacking the cut said they recovered two guns in different locations. While other researchers might have come to the same conclusions, these are my personal observations. None of them are earthshaking or change the overall outcome of the engagements but they do fine tune the interpretation of the regimental actions on the field.

They are the result of a work in progress. One dare not assert they have the final word on Gettysburg or any historical investigation because emerging evidence and varied approaches to historical interpretation will either further clarify or muddle the portrayal of the event. “Now we see through a glass darkly.” I approach history as honestly as I know how – the little boy who upset the Emperor in his new clothes.   

Once again, thank you for reading this opiniated entry and, as usual, your constructive comments and observations are always welcome.