Friday, May 22, 2020

Wargaming in 54mm (Skirmishers)



Skirmishers in this game represent an individual soldiers. Normally they would deploy on company level or larger in two ranks in extended order so that two could load while the other two fired. Their main objective in this situation is to take out the opponent’s officers.


The Red Jack activates every Confederate skirmisher on the board. For the sake of brevity, I have confined the explanation in one part of the field.


To show how far a skirmisher may move, I have labeled the original piece with and “S” and the deployed piece with a “T.” Skirmishers, like sharpshooters, may move/fire or fire/move. Terrain deductions do not apply to skirmishers, therefore the piece labeled “T” has advanced a full 19 inches into a plowed field.


Since he is firing a rifle, he uses the standard measuring stick to aim at the colonel behind the Federal line. He incurs no deduction for the fence because he is firing over it. He rolls a D10 to see if he has a chance of hitting the officer and a D6 to see how bad the injury is. 

In this case he needed a “7” or lower. He rolled a “3” and finished the officer with a “4” on the D6. When the officer is removed, the player will place a blue marker on the regiment indicating there is no officer present, which keeps it from moving. It may fire but at a deduction of ½ of a D6 roll. It has no deduction if charged and has to defend in hand-to-hand.




The two Union skirmishers may now turn and fire upon their Rebel counterpart. They each get a deduction of 1 on the measuring stick because they are firing uphill. They do not get a deduction for reacting because they are trained to act upon a response without orders. The one on the right needed a “3”. One the left, he needed a “4.” Being on target, they both roll a D6 and came up with a combined number of “4,” which removed the Reb from the board.


Along the road to the left of the cornfield, Skirmisher “R” has moved upon the flank of the zouaves in the road.


He has decided to take a crack on the zouaves’ colonel. He needed a ”6” or lower to hit the fellow and rolled a “2.” The “4” on the D6 took the colonel out.  Being on horseback has its disadvantages.


The lieutenant colonel fired back with his revolver. The maximum range is 6 inches. The Confederate is standing at the “5” mark. The Federal officer rolled a “5” on the D10 and on the D6 a “4” thereby removing the Reb from his flank.


Skirmisher “U” has moved out of the cornfield to take down the mounted Union colonel in front of his former position.


Needing a “6,” he missed, as the “0” indicates otherwise he would have eliminated the colonel.


Skirmisher “V” went after the dismounted lieutenant colonel of that same regiment.


He rolled a “3” and wounded the officer severely with a “3” on the D6.



On the far right of the cornfield, skirmisher “B” has traveled behind the line to get a clean shot on a dismounted officer behind the Union regiment.


Because he fired through a line, he got a deduction of 1 which translated into a “3” or lower to the officer. His D10 came up as a “7.”  He missed.

The next part will describe hand-to-hand combat in detail. I am also inserting an addendum to hitting officers when under regimental or artillery fire.

Thank you for reading this. I welcome constructive comments and questions. Until the next time, I thank you for reading this.












Wednesday, April 29, 2020

Wargaming in 54mm (part 3) Artillery


Artillery, the “King of Battle,”  generally accounted for about 5% - 10% of battlefield casualties during the Civil War, excepting Antietam, where some estimated the losses ranged above 30%. For the sake of brevity, this entire scenario centers around artillery in only one part of the field. 
The next card in the deck activated the Federal artillery as indicated by the King of Spades. During this activation the artillerist may move his guns or fire them, provided they have a clear target.


 The battery commander has decided to use his 6-gun battery across from the cornfield. Guns 1 and two, shown here, are firing, respectively, at the space between the advancing Federal line in great coats and the first ruler, and the smaller space between that ruler and the one to its immediate right. Gun 1 is firing solid shot (cannon ball) and gun 2 is firing explosive shell (common shell).


 The dice in front of the field represent shot. Because smoke partially obscured the gunner’s line of sight, the gunner has to roll a die to indicate whether the round went long, went short, or [if blank] actually hit the target. This one went long by 2 inches and therefore missed the line but could hit the major behind it. To score 1 hit the D10s have to have 1 pair. If it had three of a kind it would inflict two hits. In this case it hit nothing. If it had hit the officer, he would have to roll 1 D6 for each hit and suffered the consequences.


Gun 2’s shell burst and was a direct hit above and in front of the men. Again, shooting through smoke, the blank red die indicates a direct hit. Therefore, the red “6” does not count at all. Had it been 6 inches long or short, no one would have been hit, because the blast radius is 4 inches forward. Note there are two “2s.” With explosive rounds, every matching number counts as a hit. This line suffered 2 casualties.

Guns 3 and 4 have fired case shot through smoke at the two last sections of the cornfield. Case shot consisted of an explosive round filled with musket balls and proved quite deadly.


A look at gun 3’s target show that the piece fired long by 1 inch, which places it over head and therefore will hit the line. While it could, theoretically, score up to 7 hits, this round inflicted 2 hits (8 casualties) on the line.


Gun 4’s case shot exploded short but within the blast radius and scored 3 hits.


The Gun 4 nicked the lieutenant colonel, as indicated by the “6” on the D6. The colonel, however, having been wounded once earlier, suffered 3 wounds from Gun 3’s shell and has been removed from the field with a total of 4 hits. The lieutenant colonel rolled 2 D10s and because the blue die rolled the higher of the two, the regiment did not react to the fire.


To the right, Gun 5 has decided to unload canister on the left flank of the Confederate regiment to its front. For a rifled gun, it could contain around 60 musket balls packed in sawdust (depending on the manufactured) and for a 12-pounder smoothbore it could have around 27 lead, iron, or steel balls the size of golf balls, also packed in sawdust (depending upon the manufacturer).


The measuring stick has 6-inch intervals on it because of the extensive range of the canister round (450 yards). The crew will have to take a deduction of 1 because it is firing through smoke and it will have a second 1 space deduction because it is firing downhill. Therefore the 8 on the measuring stick will become a “6.”


The gunner will roll 9 D10s. All number “6” and lower will be hits. The round inflicted 4 hits. However, because it is canister the player multiplies it by the number of pieces on the crew. 4 X 3 = 12. The problem is that the round hit the regiment on the flank which doubles the hits to 24 (96 casualties) which means the Confederates lost 2 pieces (1 stand).


The Confederate officers refused the two left companies and refused the line to the rear, creating an “L” in response to the hit. (Not shown in this frame.)
The colonel took 2 hits from the round. The major, while not injured, failed to rally the men but the colonel succeeded as noted by the “5” on the blue die.


The Number 6 gun on the far right faced its gun to hit the regiment in the lower part of the plowed field. (There are no deductions to face a gun up to 90 degrees in one direction.) The gunner fired case shot through smoke at the target. 


The round struck 1 inch short a panicked regiment. (The “P” indicates the regiment is prone.) The roll produced 2 pairs which translates into 4 hits.


The lieutenant colonel was killed instantly. (D6 – “4.”) The colonel got nicked. (“6” on the D6). Since the lieutenant was eliminated, the colonel rolled to prevent more panic and succeeded. (light blue “8” on the D10.)


This scenario was repeated for the other brigade toward the middle of the board and ended this activation.


As always, I encourage you to send me courteous comments, suggestions, and observations about this segment and any of the others I have penned. During this cantankerous lockdown, I really look forward to speaking with someone else other than myself. 


Stay safe. Thank you.






Saturday, April 25, 2020

Wargaming in 54mm (part 2) Action/Reaction

      
This entry will walk the reader through the process of three activations. I intend to explain in detail how the action/reaction process works in a gaming situation. I also intend to explain how officers take casualties as well as how skirmishers, sharpshooters, and line regiments incur them. I included the firing stick as well into this scenario.



The black Queen activates the Union side’s two sharpshooters. Sharpshooters may move/fire or fire/move. Terrain deductions do not infringe on their movement. However, terrain and smoke might block their line of sight. Players are to resolve any controversy over that matter with a die roll off, with the higher number winning. The idea is to have fun, not to get into heated arguments, nor to resolve “discussions” with fisticuffs.



Note the smoke emanating from the steeple. The one Yankee sharpshooter has just fired at a group of officers in the center of the cornfield.



The ADC on horseback has gotten hit once before as indicated by the red marker.  The sniper rolls a D6. 1 – 4 score that many hits on the target. 5 – 6 means he gotten “winged” but not badly. The roll is a 1 meaning he now has been hit twice, therefore the player places the white chip under him and removes the red one. Two more hits eliminates that piece. 


The second Union sniper stands on the hill overlooking the brick farmhouse below. He has zeroed in on the artillery captain in front pf the house.


The “6” indicates that he only nicked the Reb. That ends the Union snipers’ activation.


The next card, a red Queen means the 2 Confederate sharpshooters may move/fire.


In this instance, the Confederate sharpshooter on the hill above the country road has moved into the loft of the barn and is firing at the gaggle of officers on the lower hill below. Note the targets in the foreground and the smoke from the loft at the top of the picture.


The sniper rolled a “1” which means he wounded the ADC once, which is why the red chip goes under the stand.


The second Reb sniper is along a fence in a woodlot firing at the mounted officer in the road behind the zouaves to his right front. Being mounted, the officer shows above the stonewall and is a good target.


The sharpshooter rolled a “2”. Therefore, he places a white chip under the officer. Two more hits will remove the officer from the game. 


The “3” of Hearts activate the Confederates’ Third Brigade, which occupies the cornfield in the hollow between the road and the church on the hill. When playing solitaire, I move the regiments from the left flank of the brigade to the right of the brigade.


This regiment, having been forced to do so, withdrew in a panic, as signified by the “W” and therefore has to be rallied. It still has all three staff officers. The colonel (mounted) was hid three times in that action and is in bad shape. The lieutenant colonel, in his post on the left of the line has suffered a severe wound as indicated by the “2 hit” white chip under his stand. The perished in the attack against the road and is no longer available. They have to rally the regiment or it will withdraw 6 inches to the rear and possibly disrupt the regiment moving in column behind it. 

To do so, the brigadier of that brigade will roll 2 D10s of different colors two times (one pair/officer), as needed to see if they rallied the regiment. The light blue represents the officer and the other color the men. On the first roll, the officer scored the higher number and thereby stopped the panic. The brigadier removes the “W” and places a small red marker on the line, indicating that it is disorganized. 

If both officers had failed their roll the higher number, the regiment would have kept the “W” and backed up 6 inches into the corn, destroying the fence in the process. When the red 3 is again drawn the officers will roll to the red marker to allow the regiment to activate. If not, it remains stalled on the field and can only defend itself but at a disadvantage.


In this shot, the stalled regiment is still stalled despite the fact that the red marker is not shown. The regiment behind it, being in column of 4s advances 23 of its allotted 24 inches before expending 1 movement point to face by the right flank into line.

The regiment on its right, in the cornfield, rather than expend its entire 19 inches in movement, advanced to the edge of the corn and sheltered behind the fence.


The regiment in reserve (not shown) stayed put. The one on the far right, moved by column and flanked right along the rail fence.


The left wing (4 stands) decided to react by firing and the three staff officers decided to let it do so. Therefore, they did not roll the 2 different colored D10s to stop them. [A regiment may move and fire by sections as long as there is a staff officer to control each section.] 


The stick is a wooden blind slat cut 27 inches long and divided into 9 3-inch sections (3 inches/section.) The distance from the Yankees to the rebs is “7.” Because the Confederates are behind a fence the distance gets extended to a “6.” The little red dot indicates a reaction fire which means the two stands will roll 1 D6 and divided the result in half and deduct the result from the firing stick. 1 divided by 2 = .5, which rounds up to 1. This means the “6” on the stick becomes a “5.” The brigadier rolls 4 D10s. All numbers “5” or lower score hits. The “2” equals 1 hit, the others being misses.


The second part of the regiment, to the right,  now fires, using the same formula. It rolled a “5” on the D6 which turns into a -3 on the stick and add it to -1 for the rail fence. The regular effective range of “6” less the -4 now becomes a “2.”  The left wing (half) of the regiment did some pretty poor shooting. Two his converts into 8 casualties out of 400 rounds fired.


The results are mixed. A look as the D10s show that both affected regiments did not react. When fired upon during a reaction fire the units hit may respond once.

The lieutenant colonel in the upper left of the photo got severely hit (blue chip) ass did the colonel of the regiment on the right flank (blue chip.) The major on the left of the right regiment, was moderately wounded (2 hits – white chip).

The Confederate 3rd Brigade had ended its activation. It still may be subject to reaction from Federal regiments or artillery in vicinity.

More will follow in other blogs of this series. The next one will focus on Artillery, and charges. I intend to add charts later.

As always, thank you for your patience. I genuinely appreciate constructive comment, observations, and suggestions.














Monday, April 20, 2020

Wargaming in 54mm (Part 1)



During this period of lockdown I have resorted to taking notes for the next few chapters of my Gettysburg manuscript, mown the lawn twice, run errands, and started revising and fine tuning my wargame, Chaos, Confusion, and Casualties. I believe the mechanics allow an individual to play it solitaire or in groups, on on division, army, corps, and regimental level with any scale of figures. Like so many games the players can and will tweak it to their hearts' desire.

I game with 54mm because those are the toy soldiers I happen to own and at my age, I can see and handle them a lot easier, though it has not interfered with my ability to get lost in the game and fire on "friendlies" by accident.

I am presenting annotated photos of my current game to illustrate how it is played in my basement on as 6 foot X 15 foot area. What you are looking at are 3 brigades per side and several artillery batteries engaged in a large battle.



This is a card activated game. The card deck consists of Hearts (Confederate) and Spades (Union). I organized the two decks as follows: A, 2, and three for brigade numbers; Jack - skirmishers; Queen - Sharpshooters; King artillery. This shows that the second Union Brigade has activated, which means that the brigadier may introduce a new unit to the field, move a unit, or order a unit to fire. Only one of those actions is allowed per regiment.

Looking at the deck you can see that the Union artillery has fired as have the Union skirmishers and that the Confederate skirmishers have responded. The window blind slat in the picture is a firing stick for rifles divided into 3 inch segments,



This illustrates Union Brigade 3 deploying for action. Notes the zouaves in the road to the right and to the left taking shelter behind the stone wall along the road and the rail fence to the left of the artillery section. Just along the fence is a column from Union Brigade 1 heading through a gully below the guns. Near the card, the section lieutenant it tending to his right gun while a column of infantry passes by the brigadier general and his staff (note the color bearer). on its way to support he zouaves in the road. You will also note the mounted colonels and the dismounted lieutenant colonels and majors behind or alongside the respective regiments.



Union Brigade 1 is under attack from the front and both flanks. The brigadier general and his mounted ADCs are to the left. The Division commander and his three aides appear in the foreground.
Officers in this system stop routes, detect enemy movement, and determine whether or not units react to incoming fire or charges.



For a point of reference, note the Zouaves on the left. Out of sight, the Union artillery has hit two Confederate regiments with lethal case shot. The regiment in the center foreground took casualties as noted by the homemade casualty counter. Looking closer, you can also see that it still has all three officers.

The regiment to its right rear, however panicked, withdrew 6 inches and went prone because it failed a morale check by all three officers. The casualty counter behind the line shows that it took casualties and its one staff officer has been wounded twice as indicated by the white poker chip under the officer's stand. [I will explain the mechanics of taking casualties, routing, and rallying in a future blog.]



Union Brigade 2 is advancing on the Confederate brigade moving through the cornfield. The slight puff of smoke to the left of the steeple indicates that a sharpshooter has zeroed in on one of the mounted officers in the center of the cornfield. The Union brigadier and his staff are in the front of the church while two more regiments in column of fours advance to the support of the rest of their brigade. (Sharpshooters are particularly bothersome because they have scoped rifles and can hit any officer they can see from their perches.)



This close up shows the Confederate Brigade 3 coming under artillery fire from the front and infantry movement from the right flank. Its left flank is getting pestered by Union artillery fire from the left flank also. Since this is a reaction/reaction game, the Confederate officers have to determine whether their units will react to the pressure



On the far end of the field to the left of the cornfield two Confederate regiments are advancing up a hill to flank the Federal line. Down below another regiment has charged up the road in an unsuccessful attempt to flank the Federal line on the opposite side. (Charges can and do fall short of their marks.) The colonel at the head of the column is not on the field because two Union skirmishes (note the smoke) have eliminated him in response to the charge. (He took the 4 hits required to remove an individual officer, skirmisher, or sharpshooter from the game.)

In the center of the foreground, near the downed fence is a Rebel sharpshooter in buckskins. In the upper right, at the fence corner, a rebel skirmisher has fired and taken out the mounted captain of the battery.



This is another shot of the previous side showing a Union regiment trying to flank the Confederate flankers and a regiment down along the road which has not reacted yet to the Confederate charge.



Confederate Brigade 1 , moving around the house is preparing to charge the Union guns on the hill. The Division commander and his staff gather next to the house trying to avoid the Union sharpshooter nestled between the guns on the hill along their front.

In the sections which follow I will be discussing the sequence of play, firing charts, movement charts, and some of the more detailed aspects of the play.

Thank you for reading this long presentation. I would really appreciate questions and observations from those who read this to blog because I want to address them in future entries. As always, I look forward to receiving polite and constructive inquiries

Tuesday, March 31, 2020

The Deaths of Two Lieutenants


My heart and prayers go out to everyone affected by this current pandemic. I would like to write something deep and important, however I am not adequate to the task. That would take someone far smarter than I. Therefore, I decided to share some thoughts I have about the Confederate occupation of the Railroad Cut at Gettysburg on July 1, 1863.

This exercise began while working on my account of the Railroad Cut in my new Gettysburg manuscript. After the cut had been secured and the 6th Wisconsin was mopping up, Private John Killmartin (Company G, 6th Wisconsin) joined a few other men in pursuit of Mississippians and North Carolinians trying to escape north, out of the eastern side of the cut. The Wisconsiners caught up with them and while bagging about 10 the Confederates, their lieutenant fired his pistol at them. John Killmartin shot him dead.[1]

Here is where I started tracing the line from this historical spiderweb. I found that only two Confederate lieutenants died in the track bed – 1st Lt. John C. Lauderdale (Company B, 2nd Mississippi) and 2nd Lt. Mordecai Lee (Company G, 55th North Carolina). I had to find out, if at all possible where the two of them would have been in the regimental lines. I therefore turned to Hardees Tactics.

According to the Tactics, regimental companies were to fall in from right to left, facing south (the bottom of this page), because the regiment went into action. facing east, then south as follows:    

                                                 1 6  4 9 3 [c] 8 5 10 7 2

                                                  A F D I C [c] H E K G B

The 2nd Mississippi had an additional company – L which in this article I arbitrarily placed on the right of the line. L A F D I C [c] H E K G B. I did this based upon the fact that Company B’s casualties include the following: 1 killed (Lieutenant Lauderdale), 1 wounded and 1 mortally wounded and captured. Green McCarley was the only mortally wounded man in Company B who was not captured days after the battle. Therefore, he had to have been captured by the skirmish line from the 6th Wisconsin which went out before noon. Corporals Kelly and Charles O. Jones (Company I, 6th Wisconsin) found the reb whom they shot down as he bolted from the grass north of the cut and east of Sheads Woods where the regiment was reforming. Kelly noted he was shot through the leg. Ten were captured outright attempting to escape.[2]

Adding the mortally wounded and captured to the captured results in 11 captured. The regiment reported 95 captured. Removing those 11 from the 2nd Mississippi’s captured at the cut leave 84 prisoners of war. I deducted those 84 from the 6th Wisconsin’s 232 captured and got 148 other POWs.[3] The 55th North Carolina had exactly 148 officers and men captured in the cut. The 1 missing in action more than likely should be added either to the killed or the wounded and captured.

By using Hardee’s formation, I concluded that Company B was on the left flank of the 2nd Mississippi. Since their captured numbers are apparently not in Dawes’s numbers, they had to have occurred after the fighting was over and the 6th Wisconsin was mopping up, which agrees with Kelly’s remembrance of the situation. Lieutenant Lauderdale would have been with Company B and therefore had to have been the officer Killmartin shot down.

Company L, more than likely, was on the right of Company A. The regiment went into action with about 522 officers and men. Deducting 45 line officers and an estimated 22 sergeants serving as file closers that would have left 455 rank and file on line.[4] In parade ground formation, the regiment would have covered about 455 feet.[5]

I had to estimate how many men the two regiments lost while going into action. I started with the casualties I believed I could confirm. The one thing I noticed is that the Buseys identified when and where the mortally wounded/captured and the wounded/captured were captured. I took the individuals who were captured 1 – 13 days after the battle and included them in the regiments’ wounded in action because that is how they would have appeared at that time on the rosters. I also concluded that the reason they ended up in field hospitals and in the ranks during the retreat is because they would have had to have been rescued from the areas of the field in Confederate control before the railroad cut incident. I also did not pay attention to any men where they could not substantiate when they became casualties, which removes about 12 or less men from this study.

I concluded the men listed as captured or wounded/captured, and mortally wounded/captured on July 1 had to have been captured in the railroad cut or just north of the cut between the cut and Sheads Woods. Those were the areas occupied for a few hours or so by Federal troops after the attack against the cut. They were hauled in during the mop up operations.

This resulted in a chart where I could divide the number of casualties taken after the battle to the total number of wounded during the entire day. I then constructed a table of the regimental lines in in order from the right flank to the left flank of each regiment and calculated the percentage of men wounded/mortally wounded and captured against the total number wounded, the results of which are listed as follows:

2nd Mississippi:

L: 1/7 (14%); A: 9/19 (47%); F: 1/9 (11%); D: 0; I:1/12 (8%); C: 2/13 (15%) - Right Wing

H: 5/15 (33%); E: 0; K: 7/12 (58%); G 6/14 (43%); B: 9/10 (90%) – Left Wing

55th North Carolina: excluding B which was in skirmish and not at the cut.

A: 3/10 (30%); F: 3/7 (43%); D: 3/15 (20%); I: 7/12 (58%); C: 5/10 (50%) – Right Wing

H: 3/6 (50%): E: 3/12 (25%); K: 8/9 (89%); G: 9/14 (64%) – Left Wing

To estimate the number of casualties in the assaults against the 147th New York, 76th New York, and 56th Pennsylvania I applied those individual percentages to the total number of killed and wounded, and known wounded which produced the tables shown below.



Morning
Co.
KIA
WIA
MW
T
2 MS      47%      
A
1
9
1
11
               90%
B
3
10
1
14
               15%
C
1
2
0
3

D
0
0
0
0

E
0
0
0
0
               11%
F
0
1
0
1
               43%
G
1
6
0
7
               33%
H
1
5
0
6
                 8%
I
0
1
0
1
               58%
K
1
7
0
8
               14%
L
0
1
0
1

Total
8
42
2
52



In battle line, by wings, it looks like this:

L:1; A: 11; F: 1; D: 0; I: 1; C: 3 = 17 casualties.  H: 6; E: 0; K: 8; G: 7; B: 14 = 35 casualties.

This makes perfect sense. Because the right wing of the 2nd hit the 2 right companies of the 147th New York from the north. The left wing encountered the 56th Pennsylvania.

55th NC
%/T
Co.
KIA
WIA
T
Jy1, 1863
30%
A
1
3
4
Morning
50%
C
1
5
6
Casualties
20%
D
0
3
3

25%
E
0
3
3

43%
F
2
3
5

64%
G
3
9
12

50%
H
1
3
4

58%
I
0
7
7

89%
K
2
8
10


Total
10
44
54



A: 4; F: 5; D: 3; I: 7; C: 6 = 25 casualties.  H: 4; E: 3; K: 10; G: 12 = 29 casualties.

This also seems very close. The right wing assaulted the left wing of the 76th New York while the left wing assaulted the New Yorkers’ right flank and forced the regiment to refuse that flank.

Taking those losses into account, the 2nd Mississippi, not counting field and staff, lost around 50 feet of frontage. This reduced the frontage to about 400 feet. Again, this is an estimate, it being impossible to get the exact frontage once the fighting started. Taking that into account the 55th North Carolina, which started out, deducting 20 file closers, and at least 50 feet because Company B was on skirmish, the front shrunk about 70 feet. Of the original 617 in line, it now had around 550 or a 550 foot front between 9 companies. These numbers matter when trying to place the approximate flanks of the two regiments in the railroad cut.

The map below shows the regimental fronts at the cut at the time of its capture. Company K, 55th North Carolina had no one captured, suggesting that it left the cut before the 6th Wisconsin charged it, which left Company G stranded. The frontage represents the approximate length of the lines, despite the fact that the two Confederate regiments actually got jumbled together in the charge. The 6th Wisconsin lost about 50% of its men in the attack from the Chambersburg Road to the cut. 




Despite their assertions to taking heavy casualties, the 14th Brooklyn and the 95th New York have no records by way of a nominal list to substantiate they lost heavily in the attack. They had been on the right of the Iron Brigade line at Herbst Woods on the crest of McPherson’s Ridge, west of the barn where they engaged the 5th Alabama Battalion, which was acting as skirmishers for Brig. Gen. James Archer’s brigade. The suffered probably a handful of casualties there before being sent to the 6th Wisconsin’s assistance. I can only account for 5 casualties in that attack. One was killed with three of the 4 men evacuating him from the field after the action, and the other died from losing his leg.[6] The accounts from the 6th Wisconsin show the 95th New York on the left of the line and the 14th Brooklyn overlapping the rear of the 6th Wisconsin and not on the left of the 95th as usually shown.[7] Therefore, to represent their frontage somewhat accurately, I reduced their numbers to 200 men (95th New York) and 300 (14th Brooklyn).

With that all in mind, I constructed two charts, one of the 2nd Mississippi and the other for the 55th North Carolina, reflecting their casualties in the cut which includes all of the captured in the fighting.

RR Cut
Co.
KIA
WIA
MW
MW/CIA
WIA/CIA
CIA
MIA
T
2 Miss

A
1
10
1
0
2
5
0
19

B
1
3
0
1
0
10
0
15

C
4
11
0
0
0
12
0
27

D
2
5
0
0
0
5
0
12

E
2
9
0
0
0
22
0
33

F
2
8
1
1
0
7
0
19

G
1
8
0
0
0
3
0
12

H
2
10
0
0
0
8
0
20

I
3
11
3
0
0
10
0
27

K
0
5
0
0
0
6
0
11

L
1
6
1
3
0
7
0
18

Total
19
84
6
5
2
95
0
223



55th NC
Co.
KIA
WIA
MW
MW/CIA
WIA/CIA
CIA
MIA
T
Jy1, 1863
A
2
7
0
0
6
22
0
37
RR Cut
B
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Casualties
C
2
0
0
2
3
23
0
30

D
4
12
0
4
5
10
0
35

E
1
9
0
2
7
26
0
45

F
2
4
0
0
1
19
0
26

G
2
5
0
2
3
19
0
31

H
2
3
0
1
2
14
1
23

I
0
5
0
0
5
15
0
25

K
0
1
0
1
5
0
0
7

Total
15
46
0
12
37
148
1
259



Using that data, I constructed two battle line charts to compare the casualties in cut in the probable order in which they occurred.

2nd Mississippi

Casualties        L    A    F    D   I    C                     H    E    K   G   B

KIA                 1    1    2    2    3   4                    2     2    0    1   1

WIA                6   10   8    5  11  11                  10     9    5    8   3

MW                 1    1    1    0    3    0                   0     0    0    0   0

MW/CIA          3   0     1    0    0    0                    0     0    0    0   1

WIA/CIA         0   2     0    0    0    0                    0     0    0    0   0


Total              18 19   19  12  27  27 T: 122       20   33  11  12  15 T: 76 + 15 = 198 and 15

The red numbers represent the 11 men in Company B who got flushed out of the cut after the fighting was over and the one man wounded in the leg and left on the field. Note that the captured in black total the number of men wounded in 10 of the 11 companies. Company B had 10 men captured after the fight and one who was reported wounded but ended up being left on the field and captured by the federal skirmish line.  He would not have been counted among the captured at the cut because he was taken later. Either way, Dawes could have miscounted his prisoners also and erred by one.





55th North Carolina

Casualties        A    F    D    I    C               H    E    K   G  

KIA[J1] [J2]      2    2    4    0   2               2     1    0   2  

WIA                  7    4  12    5   0               3     9    1   5  

MW/CIA            0    0    4    0   2               1     2    1   2  

WIA/CIA           6    1    5    5   3               2     7    5   3 

MIA                 0    0    0    0   0               1     0    0    0                                  


Total              37  26  35  25 30              23   45   7  31

What do the casualty numbers tell me about what happened at the cut?   

55th North Carolina: Frontage 549 feet

          A    F    D    I    C : 305 feet       H     E    K   G : 244 feet

CIA 22  19  10  15 23 T: 89          14   26    0  19 T: 59     59+89=148

2nd Mississippi: Frontage 395 feet

        L    A    F    D    I    C: 216 feet       H    E    K   G     B: 180 feet

CIA 7   5     7    5  10  12 T: 46          8   22    6    3  10[J3]  T: 39+46 = 85

The 55th North Carolina overlapped the rear of the 2nd Mississippi by 152 feet. Company K and Company G occupied around 120 feet of that ground until Company K quit the field, leaving a gap in the line and Company G with 2nd Lt. Mordecai Lee to get flanked by 20 men from the right of the 6th Wisconsin. Those men killed, mortally wounded, or wounded 22 of the Carolinians and captured another 19.

The entire front of the 6th Wisconsin did not overlap all of Company B, 2nd Mississippi. The 20 men, who overpowered Company G, 55th Mississippi, more than likely missed part of Company B. As the Yankees began rousting out prisoners, Lieutenant Lauderdale, at his assigned post to the left rear of the company, apparently saw an opportunity to escape when Kelly and some of the men in the flanking party spotted them and gave chase. That is when the lieutenant got himself killed.

This blog has really spun into quite a cobweb from the single thread with which I started. I think I am right. Judge the maps, the numbers, and the logic for yourself. I am quite satisfied that I have brought those two men to light and have explained where and how they passed into the next life.  



[1] Isaiah F. Kelly to Rufus R. Dawes, August 2, 1892 as cited in Lance J. Herdegen and William J. K. Beaudot, In the Bloody Railroad Cut at Gettysburg, El Dorado Hills, CA, 2015, 208, fn74; John W. Busey and Travis W. Busey, Confederate Casualties at Gettysburg: A Comprehensive Record, 4 vols., (vol. 2), Jefferson, NC: 2017, 645.  
[2] Isaiah F. Kelly to Rufus R. Dawes, August 2, 1892 as cited Herdegen and Beaudot, In the Bloody Railroad Cut at Gettysburg, 209, fn74; Busey and Busey, Confederate Casualties at Gettysburg, vol. 2, 643, 644, 645. Herdegen identifies Jones as Enoch Jones of Company G, 6th Wisconsin. The roster shows he did not enlist until 1864.
[3] Rufus R. Dawes, Service With the Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers, Marietta, OH, 1890, 169.
[4] John W. Busey and David G. Martin, Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg, 4th Edition, Highttown, NJ, 2005, 224. 
[5] Jack Coggins, Arms and Equipment of the Civil War, Garden City, NY, 1962, 21.
[6] Frank Callenda, The 14th Brooklyn Regiment in the Civil War, Jefferson, NC, 2013, 145; D. R. Marquis, and C. V. Tevis, History of the Fighting Fourteenth, Brooklyn, NY, 1911, 83, 84.  
[7] Herdegen and Beaudot, In the Bloody Railroad Cut at Gettysburg,287-299. Appendix 2 is devoted to this controversy.


 [J1]
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