My apologies for the delay in getting another blog out, but I have been very busy going to the doctor, reading books to review for Civil War News, further tweaking Chaos, Confusion, and Casualties, doing research for and writing my newest project, and generally slacking off to “think.” My mind seldom slows down and it literally drives me nuts. Writing tends to slow me down to reflect on what I have to say.
I am reading a very good book right now
about the U.S. Civil War did or did not influence the British military prior to
the Boer War. Until I encountered this work, I never realized how different our
land forces appeared to the Europeans, in particular, the British. The general
consensus considered the American forces on both sides of the conflict as amateurs,
in particular, the cavalry. The British officers likened them to Yeoman
cavalry, as opposed to genuine “horsemen,” who, when given the opportunity,
preferred fighting dismounted with rifles or carbines, rather than with sabres
and lances. It reminds me of an “Indiana Jones” movie where he shot his
opponent rather than use his bullwhip on him.
It is a fair observation. U.S. drill
manuals at the time instructed the trooper how to fight dismounted and how to
load a revolver while mounted. They also had sabre drill. George Armstrong
Custer and J. E. B. Stuart, as late as 1864, in the Wilderness and on the way
to Spotsylvania still used sabre charges in preference to dismounted
engagements, much to the chagrin of their men. Wade Hampton, however, during the
same campaign, generally deployed in skirmish order. The British, while
allowing native and Yeoman regiments engage as mounted infantry, seems to have
stubbornly clung to the image of superb horsemen, well-aligned, and highly
disciplined dashing in on the fleeing enemy to with blades flashing in the
sunlight.
Britain, because of its empire, had to
have a professional army, something which, at the time, the Americans feared
and actually held in some disdain. It is similar to the pre-World War II image
of a service man being someone who could not get a job in civilian life. I say
that with the caveat that popular perception does not necessarily reflect
reality.
The problem with amateurs is that they do
not always play by the rules – if they even know what they are. Ever since the
American War for Independence (and before), Americans have clung to the myth
that a professional army is not required when an armed populace of free men,
who also are crack shots, (thanks to James Fennimore Cooper), enter the
conflict.
My personal opinion, and that is all that
it is, is that a country established by rebellion will often produce
independent thinking, freedom loving individualists. I cannot prove it. I
cannot easily document it. However, I
believe our military has historically reflected that very principal. During the
first year of the Civil War a large number of units elected their company and
regimental officers. I have seen some evidence of Hampton Legion doing that as
late as 1864. Private Shugan Snow (Company I) became the new captain, then commanding
officer of the company sized 12th North Carolina a short time before
the Battle of Fox’s Gap on September 14, 1862. In the Army of Northern Virginia
enlisted men were known to touch speak to their regimental officers without
asking permission first, something not allowed in the Army of the Potomac.
The British correctly observed that the
greater part of the American armies in “The War” were, indeed, amateurs as
opposed to professionals in the European sense of the terms. The Western
armies, in particular, turned out being less “spit and polish, than their
Eastern counterparts. They brought the war home to the Deep South as did
Sheridan’s cavalry to the Shenandoah Valley. The war converted both amateur
armies into hardened veterans as do all wars.
The other thing running through my mind is
how important the minutiae in historical records really matter in interpreting
a particular event. I am trying to piece together one of the most complicated
events I have ever researched: July 1, 1863 at Gettysburg. It is like trying to
reconstruct a massive puzzle which someone has thrown on the floor where none
of the pieces are cut alike. The moment I think I understand what transpired,
the more I realize that seemingly unreconcilable account intervene to muddle
the picture more.
The two hour morning engagement west of
the town consists of around four interconnected yet isolated actions. It is
every bit as confusing and as complicated as the Morning Phase of the Cornfield
at Antietam nine months earlier. I am exploring a number of glitches in
the general interpretation of the
fighting which I have to resolve or clarify which take a great deal of time to
explain. Lieutenant Calef’s U.S. Regular battery appears to have lost one of Sgt.
Pergel’s guns to Confederate artillery fire during Archer’s attack against
Herbst Woods. The 14th Brooklyn did not strike the western railroad
cut as commonly shown. James A. Hall’s battery left three guns, not one, on the
field which explains why the infantry attacking the cut said they recovered two
guns in different locations. While other researchers might have come to the
same conclusions, these are my personal observations. None of them are
earthshaking or change the overall outcome of the engagements but they do fine
tune the interpretation of the regimental actions on the field.
They are the result of a work in progress.
One dare not assert they have the final word on Gettysburg or any historical
investigation because emerging evidence and varied approaches to historical
interpretation will either further clarify or muddle the portrayal of the
event. “Now we see through a glass darkly.” I approach history as honestly as I
know how – the little boy who upset the Emperor in his new clothes.
Once again, thank you for reading this
opiniated entry and, as usual, your constructive comments and observations are
always welcome.
