Turn 2 Wargaming Herbst Woods, July 1, 1863

I am shooting the final turn of this small scenario this week. There are five turns. The idea is to produce a sample game which the readers can download to create their own rules set. The beauty of miniature wargaming is that the players tweak the rules to meet the specific needs of their game. It is comparable to doing historical research where new information changes the original narrative.

Over the following month of so, I will be blogging in a more traditional manner by interrupting the flow of the game with "normal commentaries as well. I genuinely appreciate your patience in this process. My mind doe snot fire in any particular sequence at times and I want to provide the audience with a variety of commentaries.

Turn 2 Confederate initiative.

The 6d represent the Adjusted Range. The Confederate are red and the Federal white. 

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Close up of calculating officer casualties. Officer casualties are checked when a piece is lost.

The two wings did not collide therefore the right wing does not have to roll for a panic check.

Once again, thank you for reviewing this long entry. Your thoughtful and constructive observations and comments are always welcome.

Wargaming Herbst Woods Turn 1

What follows is photographic presentation of  my game rules "By the Left Flank!" This is Turn One. I figured it would be easier to introduce the rules as the game is played than in the traditional rule book format. As always, constructive questions and observations are always welcome. This game can be played solo or by two or more players at this small scale.

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The measuring sticks are made from wooden window blind slats.

My apologies for the typing error.

Turn 2 follows next week. I thank you for your patience because I am learning the photo editing as I go along. Again, I thoroughly appreciate your observations and comments.

Miniature Wargaming Herbst Woods in 54mm

At the request of a colleague and fellow miniature wargamer, I decided to recreate Herbst Woods at Gettysburg, July , 1863 for our next game. Using the excellent base maps which cartographer Stephen Stanley generated for my newest Gettysburg project, I developed an Heroscape version of the battlefield.

The Trees and fences are Marx reproductions. Unless otherwise noted, the figures are by Conte. 

Each hex represents 50 feet of terrain and each infantry piece, officers excepted, represent 50 men in two ranks with file closers. The two Confederate regiments are the 26^th North Carolina and the 11^th North Carolina. The Iron Brigade from left to right are the 19^th Indiana. 24^th Michigan, 17^th Wisconsin, and 2^nd Wisconsin. Interestingly enough, the length of the regimental lines are to scale according to the descriptions left by the veterans of the four regiments. Based upon the frontages and the actual western face of the woods, the 2^nd Wisconsin would have to have faced north to secure the brigade’s right flank and still be covered by the woods.

The ravines are steeper in the model than on the contour map because it was physically impossible to reproduce them exactly with the Heroscape pieces The distinct ridgelines, however is to scale with the Stanley maps for the distance between each ridge.

The creek hexes represent the creek bans on both sides. It was not possible to make it to scale using Heroscape.

Movement can be anywhere from 1 – 9 inches (50-450 feet), which reflect lock step to the double quick. The flexibility of the rate allows the players to deduct distance from each move for ascending and descending contours, jumping of wading the creek and slogging through the marshy creek bottoms. (Gettysburg gets very soggy.) 

A deduction of 1 inch applies per layer of the Heroscape.

Over the next several blogs I intend to present my informal rules set, By the Left Flank! In stages. This is the introduction to the basics of the scale for movement and organization. Future posts will address Turn Sequence, Firing, Hand to Hand Combat, Casualty Recording, Skirmishers, Role of Officers. I intend to explain the game through annotated photographs as I play the game solo.

I thank you for your patience with this experiment and genuinely encourage constructive questions and observations.

"Do This Mean What I Think It Do?"

I borrowed this title from John Wayne’s “The Alamo” where two of the wounded character actors are facing imminent death at the hands of two soldados and the one turns to the other and says “Does this mean what I think it do?” “It do,” his comrade replies. The scene, I believe, truthfully relates to a dilemma the historian encounters when an evidence trail leads to an unanticipated and uncomfortable conclusion. There is no easy way to deal with the problem I have encountered other than to lay out the evidence and let the proverbial “chips fall where they may.”

On November 18. 1863 Col. William W. Robinson, 7^th Wisconsin, penned his after-action report of the battle of Gettysburg, and since then it has become one of the foundational accounts of the heroic stand of the I Corps on July 1, 1863. However, since then, a great many more primary accounts have surfaced through the work of renowned Iron Brigade historian, Lance Herdegen. Using those accounts and those of other participants in the action at Herbst Woods has led me to draw conclusions which question the veracity of Robinson’s report.

1.      Robinson said the 7^th Wisconsin arrived near Gettysburg about 10:00 a.m.

   His lieutenant colonel, John B. Callis in a letter to battle historian. John B. Bachelder wrote that the colonel “went to the rear” about 9:00 am. or later in the afternoon when he heard of General Solomon Meredith’s wounding. I think the evidence shows he left eh column in the morning and did not show up until after Meredith left the field.

2.      Robinson writes, “We had not halted to load, and no orders had been received to do so…I. however, gave the order to load during the movement,,,so that no time was lost by this omission.”

   At the first reunion of the 19^th Indiana in1871 at  Cambridge City, Indiana, Capt. Hollon Richardson, senior staff officer of the Iron Brigade, and Meredith’s son-in-law stated, “ By the order of Gen. Meredith, I directed the several Colonels in their order of columns to move forward into line and directed them to load as they came into line.”

(As a side note, Richardson married the colonel’s daughter secretly on May 9, 1862 which created bad blood between the two until 1864.)

   Two enlisted men in the 7^th Wisconsin clearly indicated they went into action with loaded weapons.

3.      Robinson deployed his regiment along the fence on the crest of McPherson ridge with his right flank anchored on the southeast corner of Herbst Woods while the 2^nd Wisconsin entered the woods to his right front. He said that Capt. Craig Wadsworth rode up to him from the right (north) and the colonel asked him to identify what troops ere hidden in the smoke to his front. Robinson was not sure if it was Confederates or the left of the 2^nd Wisconsin. Wadsworth pointed to a Confederate battle flag jutting above the smoke to the left front, some 200 yards away.

   Lieutenant Colonel John B. Callis and Maj. Mark Finnicum (7^th Wisconsin) both said otherwise. Callis said the regiment was moving right in front when it was his by the first volley which struck the 2^nd Wisconsin to his front. Both he and the major recalled both regiments getting hit by that fir, which knocked down a “many of our men.” (Finnicum sent a report to the governor of Wisconsin on July 24, 1863.)

   Callis was wounded slightly and his horse died in that volley. He hurriedly organized his men into line, ordered them to fix bayonets and charge. Just as they did so Wadsworth, riding in from the north, where he had left the slain Gen. John F. Reynolds, ordered them to stop but to no avail.

4.      Robinson waited for the 19^th Indiana and the 24^th Michigan to come up on his left before the regiments fired and charged.

   In Ltc. William W. Dudley’s “The Iron Brigade at Gettysburg,” (1879) the only brigade level report of the brigade in that battle stated, “The 7^th Wisconsin, and the following regiments were hurried up and, forming line of battle from line of march, launched upon the enemy without alignment, thus in effect charging en echelon.” (Dudley commanded the 19^th Indiana and lost a leg at Gettysburg.)

   This matches Richardson’s account of delivering the order to form line by taking the order from colonel to colonel and it also explains why no Confederates saw a massive Federal line to their front.

5.      Colonel Robinson said that after the brigade overran Archer’s Confederate brigade that General Meredith personally ordered his to cross to the eastern side of Willoughby Run and he fell into the brigade line. He places the 7^th Wisconsin on the right of the line with the 2^nd Wisconsin to its left.

   Dudley, the historian of the 24^th Michigan, Callis and Sgt. Cornelius Wheeler (2^nd Wisconsin) places the brigade order from south to north as: 19^th Indiana, 24^th Michigan, 7^th Wisconsin, 2^nd Wisconsin, with the 2^nd facing north, inside the wood line, at a right angle to the 7^th Wisconsin.

6.      At the time of the 3:00 p.m. attack of Heth’s Division against Herbst Woods, Robinson asserts, “Captain Richardson brought me the order to retire to Seminary Ridge. I retired by the right of companies to the rear…”

   Major Finnicum in his July 24 letter to the governor penned. “At this time a staff officer came to Col. Robinson, with orders to fall back with the 7^th Regt. and form a new line of battle.”

   Richardson confirms this in part. After witnessing Dudley’s and Genera; Meredith’s wounding, “I had but time to say God bless and preserve you, when I dashed on to make our third stand. After giving the enemy a good round volley we moved back by right of company to the rear.” He further says the regiment turned about three times in retreat to deliver shots at the enemy.

   John B. Callis confirms this but adds, “This was about 3 o’clock in the afternoon when I received a line from Gen. Meredith saying, ‘I am hurt and cannot get to you, take command of the brigade and get out of that little end of a V as best you can.” He proceeded to order the regiment to retreat by “right of companies to the rear,” and., as noted by Richardson, fell back to face about and return fired several times.

   If Richardson was senior officer, he should have gotten brigade command but he did not, according to his own report, get command until later in the evening when what was left of the brigade reached Cemetery Hill.

   On July 14, 1863, the brigade’s division commander, General James Wadsworth, wrote Governor Alexander W. Randall (Wisconsin), the following: In the battle of Gettysburg, as senior staff officer of the Brigade, a large and unusual amount of responsibility devolved upon him [Hollon Richardson], amounting at times to the command of the brigade. His conduct on this as on other occasions of severe trial, was in highest degree meritorious.”

   It is interesting to note that 10 days later Major Finnicum, and not acting brigade commander, Colonel Robinson, wrote a letter to the governor in which he cites Robinson as being on the field at the commencement of the retreat and mentions the wounding of John B. Callis. (Finnicum fought in the ranks of Company E like an enlisted man and was not behind the regiment as he should have been. No apparent command control existed in the brigade at this time.)

   On August 13, 1863 General Lysander Cutler, commanding the 2^nd Brigade, Wadsworth’s brigade, wrote to former governor Edward Solomon, “Sir: I desire to recommend to your especial consideration, Captain Hollon Richardson, of the 7^th Wisconsin Volunteers…”on the bloody field of Gettysburg, where he manifested the utmost coolness and bravery , entitle him to the especial consideration of the Executive of the State he has so much honored. At Gettysburg he virtually commanded the brigade for a portion of the day. It cannot be known how many lives he saved by the manner in which he brought off the troops from that field…when there seemed to be no one else to give orders, most of the field officers having been killed or wounded.”

   It is interesting that Cutler felt compelled to write the former governor (presumably to tell the current governor) to reinforce what his division commander had already stated.

   Callis, who was on foot and in full retreat with his men never had the opportunity to command the brigade. He was shot down while trying to get the Federal artillery from shredding their own line with canister.

7.      Robinson’s account of the retreat through town is very accurate. He apparently came upon what was left of the regiment at the rail barricade in the low ground west of Seminary Ridge. Finnicum said he came upon seven of the regiment’s companies where the colonel had rallied the men in “Splendid style.”

8.      Robinson interestingly writes that during the retreat from the Seminary to the town, I met with the heaviest losses from the regiment during the day.” Had he been on the field during the first volley and during the retreat through Herbst Woods, he would not have written that. It was the largest number of losses sustained while he was with the regiment. Conclusion: Robinson wrote his report based upon the testimony of the few officers and men who survived the morning and early afternoon fight. He was not with the regiment until it retired to Seminary Ridge. I do not know why he was not with the regiment or the brigade until that time, I can only suppose that he had fallen ill in the excessive heat and humidity. He was not a coward by any means but he was not a witness to the fight until the retreat through town.

The Way I See It

I wanted this blog to be dynamic, earth shattering, memorable. BUT wantin’ ain’t gettin’. Funny, how history is not always what we want it to be. I had a great conversation last week with an aspiring historian about methodology, historiography, and research, in general. It began, as I recall with separating the truth from the fiction, about writing about what really happened as opposed to what we have been taught.

The United Daughters of the Confederacy and the Lost Cause came up. As a boy growing up in Virginia I knew that the War Between the States was started by the money grubbing Yankees and their tariffs, and arrogance. I also knew that “damnYankee” was one word - until I went to college.

I knew that every Good Ole Rebel was fighting for independence and not for the perpetuation of slavery and that the Southern Confederacy was truly united – kind of oxymoronic, isn’t it? (A united Confederation.) Dr. Phil McGraw says that “perception is reality” and I agree, however being somewhat “teched,” I also know that perceived truth is not always the truth. Perhaps the blessing of knowing that I am flawed makes it easier to identify misperceptions because I have had first hand experiences with them.

The truth is that slavery was the underlying cause of the war, despite the fact that the average U.S. citizen did not care to admit that. Lincoln knew that when he committed the nation to an undeclared war. The Southern economy, political structure, and society evolved around the ownership of human property. The 25% of the landed citizenry, including freedmen owned slaves. Like it or not, the records show that.

The South was never united. Every Confederate state except South Carolina provided at least one white regiment or battery to the Union Army. South Carolina provided the first black regiment, the 1st South Carolina Volunteers. A quick check of Dyer’s Compendium of the War of the Rebellion proves it.

We discussed how the war is portrayed in popular culture – bold men courageously standing shoulder-to-shoulder blazing away at each other under the direction of mounted officers who could control everything like generals in a board game. Cardboard soldiers on a checkerboard field. It just was not that way.

High humidity, rolling hills, impenetrable smoke, ear numbing, head jarring noise and chaos dominated the field. Visibility could be reduced to a matter of feet. That is when the close engagements occurred; even then if the ground afforded cover the soldiers took advantage of it with or without orders.  Men did turn and walk off the field rather than face annihilation. They displayed common sense not cowardice.

Grandma might have told you that her grandfather led a charge, when he might not have. The pension records could possibly verify that. The war was not glorious. From the human perspective, no war is. Romanticizing it does a disservice to the men, women, and children who perished.  It was gruesome, filthy, and brutal. During the conflict some Confederate infantry did wear blue uniforms into battle and did fly the U.S. flag. Both sides used exploding bullets – early versions of dumdums. Both sides during an engagement would occasionally finish off wounded men and the soldiers trying to surrender. On some fields the dead were cremated because the armies had lost too many men to bury. Officers got “fragged” (murdered) by enlisted men. Artillery did deliberately fire through their own troops to save their guns. Soldiers lied down and let “green” troops go to their certain deaths.

A considerable portion of the armies deserted at one time or another throughout the war. The armies executed murderers and rapists, as well as deserters. The problem with researching any history is that it makes a person uncomfortable. I think, perhaps, that as a people, according to the news, have gotten too thin-skinned. We cannot laugh at ourselves or with ourselves. We’re too self-centered and narrowly focused. I do not know. We cannot undo what happened. We need to accept that it did and our wishing it had not occurred will not change it one bit.

It kind of reminds me of the sending off of a slow cowpoke at his funeral. “The Good Book says something about the quick and the dead. Well, Shorty he shore warent quick but he shore are dead.”

The monuments on battlefields are dedicated mostly to the fallen rather than the living. They are tombstones. There is nothing wrong with them. They remind us of the horrible cost of war. I accept them for what they are. They reflect the lives of the dead they way we prefer to remember them, and not, necessarily the way they were. They often represent the sentimental, inspiring reminders of a past which has been sanitized and glorified to help us cope with the Dantean reality of the senseless carnage of war. Rather than destroy them, deface them or remove them because they represent the “wrong side” or the individuals who fought for the “wrong side,” use them as aids to facilitate learning about why they exist and why they are so controversial. Burying the sins of the past without dealing them is like sweeping the proverbial “dirt under the rug.” The problem is hidden and not being dealt with at all.

We discussed how difficult it is to reconcile “family stories” with what really happened. I had relatives on both sides during the war. Two great-great uncles fought with the 16th Tennessee Mounted infantry at Murfreesboro. One was killed, the other captured. That uncle took the oath after spending time on Johnson’s Island but never reconstructed. I had two other relatives in the Union. One was discharged with a disability and the other told my grandmother he hauled cannonballs during the war. He served in the 5th New York Heavies until 1863. After getting promoted to corporal, he deserted. Not everyone who serves is a hero. Not all heroes are nice people. It is easier to glorify the inglorious than to deal with the reality. As humans we generally reserve our platitudes until the funeral, as reflected in most monuments and tombstones. We mummify our dead through embalming; earlier in our history individuals took photographs of the deceased, and we erect tombstones to remind us of their existence. Very few tombstones reflect the reality of those individuals. If they did, they would read like the following actual inscriptions:

Here Lies My Wife,

A Slattern and a Shrew

If I Should Say I Loved Her,

I Would Lie Here Too

Here Lies John Smith

And His Wife.

Their Warfare Is Accomplished

     Thank you for taking the time to read this. Constructive comments are always welcomed.