The next published account of the action
on September 17 appeared in 1872 in John Mead Gould, History of the First-Tenth-Twenty-ninth Maine Regiment in the Service
of the United States From May 3, 1862, to June 21, 1866. He spent 33 pages
describing the regiment’s role in the battle including in depth descriptions of
the tactical deployment of the 10th Maine on company level. Without
question, this is among one of the most comprehensive narratives of any
regiment upon the field that day. He undoubtedly relied upon other
participants’ recollections to create this account. I have listed below the new
material with commentary as well as other items mentioned in previous sources.[1]
1)
Slept
quietly until about 5:00 a.m. when a sharp rattle of musketry brings us to our
feet. (232). [Agrees with the Journal, however,
most accounts, including Gould’s memo, say that artillery fire at 5:30 a.m.
awakened them.]
2)
No
breakfast, broke [rifle] stacks and waited for orders. (233)
3)
Soon
come to a post and rail fence and tear it down to move toward firing. (233)
[South. Agree with memo and Journal.]
4)
Pass
through Best’s Battery. [Capt. Clermont Best was the XII Corps, chief of
artillery. His old battery, the 4th Maine Battery was across the
creek on a hill south of the Pry house, and not on the field. The regiment
passed Pennsylvania Light,
Battery E, Cpt Joseph M. Knap, commanding which was posted along their line of
march.]
5)
We
are ordered to lie down under a little knoll which sheltered us from artillery
for an hour “by the watch.” (233) [This is immediately east of Joseph Poffenberger’s
house and is in agreement with the Journal.]
6)
General
Mansfield, here, remarked very quietly to Col. [George L.] Beal, “We are in
reserve to-day, sir.” “and every man heard it or says he did.” (233) [The
general apparently spoke louder than he intended because of the burst shells
behind the line.]
7)
Occasionally,
we rose up to see what was going on. Out of the woods, [Samuel Poffenberger’s]
to the left from came swarms of wounded and skulks. (234)
8)
We
all saw Mansfield ride about the field in his new untarnished uniform. “His
long silvery hair flowing out behind him, and we all loved him.” (235)
9)
The
general was on a knoll in our front, watching the battle until the artillery
fire shifted and he rode rapidly toward his troops and set them in motion.
(235) [This agrees with the Journal,
194.]
10) We started south but the general ordered a
“left oblique” but we did not gain enough distance, The general still motioned
us to the left. We sidled into a small cornfield where Colonel Beal ordered
“Left flank!” We found our places and moved into the plowed field east of a
road [Smoketown Road]. (235) [In agreement with the Journal, 194.]
11) [While sidling into the small cornfield] “We
saw in the open field away through the woods a group of forty or fifty men
around the stars and stripes, quite near an abandoned gun or limber. They were
falling to the rear inch by inch, the color sergeant waving his flag , and the
officers shouting and beckoning for the men who had gone to the rear to return,
which some of them did.” Some of us supposed it might have been the enemy
trying “to steal upon us without being fired at.” (238) [He refers to this in
the Journal, 194. Also see the
citation in this footnote to reference Pvt. Frank Holsinger (Company F, 8th
Pennsylvania Reserves), who witnessed this incident.][2]
12) “It was almost exactly 7.30 o’clock, by my
watch, when we went through the gap in the fences of this road.” (235- 236)
[The actual time was 7:20 a.m., Gould’s watch being 5 – 10 minutes fast. This
agrees with his diary memo.]
13) We see Asst. Surgeon Leland [Error: Albert A.
Kendall], 12th Massachusetts, being carried off, mortally wounded
when Gen. [Joseph] Hooker [I Corps, commanding] rode up and asked our officers
what regiment we were. He said the rebs were breaking through his lines and,”You
must hold those woods!”(236) [East
Woods. Not in the Journal.]
14) We are a few rods into the plowed field when
we are ordered “Right flank!” (236)
15) We are in column of division [2 company front]
advancing toward the east and Mansfield refuses to allow us to deploy in line
of battle. He tells Col. Beal we could be handled better en masse. (236)
16) A few stray bullets whizz by as we cross the
road. (236)
17) We march into a gentle swale and up when we
see the woods again. (236) [This indicates that the plowed field Gould mentions
was the ground immediately north of the grass field in front of the East Woods
and that he might have erred in referring the grass field as a plowed one.]
18) Once we see the woods, the lead companies came
under fire from a Confederate skirmish line at the fence separating the field
from the woods. Their fire fell short or went over us. Most of us paid no attention to it. (236) [In
the Journal this is where he said
Pvt. McGinty was killed. They were advancing against the 21st
Georgia – about 175 offices and men – under the command of Capt. James Cooper
Nisbet (Company H).]
19) “We saw no union troops except one of the new
Penn. Regiments, the 128th [125th] which was on the right
[west] side of the road, also advancing in mass [sic].” (236) [The 125th
was behind the 10th Maine during the advance and was in “column of
company, closed en masse.”]
20) “We were
under fire and advancing at a brisk walk closed in mass [sic], that is
ten ranks deep (or fifteen ranks, counting file closers). We were almost as
good a target as a barn.” (237) [In this formation, the column was about 52
feet wide, a very compact target.]
21) We were losing men at every step (about 1/6 of
our total losses) and Colonel Beal, without orders, ordered us to deploy in
line of battle at the double-quick. (237) [The regiment was descending into a
basin. Its northern edge measures 629 feet west to east. However a
southwesterly running ridge narrows the approach to 180 feet at its southern
side. On the western edge of the field. The Smoketown Road follows another, lower
ridge to the northern face of the woods. In descending into the low ground, the
road and the ledge constricted the regimental front and affected its
deployment.]
22) The rebels retired as we advanced and when we
reach the fence, Company F and part of Company C were refused, sheltering
behind the ledge on the left. (237)
23) The right of the line went over the fence into
the woods, many ahead of the colors and may have been hit by our own men. (237)
[In his Mansfield piece written in the 1890’s Gould mentions that the regiment
formed a left quarter wheel, facing southeast.]
24) The 10th
Maine was armed with the Johnston and Dow Patent Cartridge – a combustible
round which did not have to be torn open to fire. The regiment could fire
faster than the Confederates. (239)
25) Just before our first fie the colonel’s horse
was shot in the head. The animal became unmanageable, reeled around and forced
the colonel to dismount. He was shot through both legs the second he
dismounted. (240) [Vivid description in the Journal,
194.]
26) The horse kicked Lt. Fillebrown in the chest
and stomach [groin] and Major [Charles] Walker who had been sick for a month
[diarrhea] hobbled along behind us but in effect we had no one in command. This
occurred before the regiment had fired two rounds. (240) [This occurred within
a matter of a minute.]
27) Mansfield beckoned us from Croasdale Knoll to
cease fire but the few who noticed him did not know what his motions meant. (240)
28) He rode down the hill from [behind] the 128th
Pennsylvania [125th] and quickly passed through the right of the
line [Company H] passing across H, A, K, E, I G, D, he yelled at them to cease
fire. He halted at C [south of the end of the ledge] where Sergt. [Henry A.]
Burnham and Capt. [William P.] Jordan [both Company C] asking him to see their
gray coats and that they were aiming at him. (240)
29) “Yes, yes, you are right,” Mansfield replied
when he was hit. (240) [Some question exists as to how accurately Jordan
recorded this event and whether or not Mansfield really recognized the men
across from him were Confederates.]
30) The general turned and attempted to put his
horse over the rails and failed to do so. He dismounted and a gust of wind blew
his coat open and we saw that he was wounded in the body. (240) [Note that the
nonexistent wind blew open the general’s coat. This is at variance with the
letter to Mrs. Mansfield and with the Journal,
194.]
31) “Sergt. Joe Merrill [Company F], Storer Knight
[Company D] and I took the General to the rear, assisted for a while by a negro
cook of Hooker’s corps.” (240-241) [He does not mention waiting awhile for help
to evacuate the general but implies it was immediate. He then goes on to
describe the fighting of the regiment after he put the general in an ambulance
near Sam Poffenberger’s Woods.] (241)
[1] Gould, History of the 1st-10th-29th Maine,
(Portland, ME, 1872), 232 – 261. The footnotes in this section will be cited in
parenthesis at the end of each statement.
[2]
Frank
Holsinger, How Does One Feel Under Fire?,” War Talks in Kansas. A Series of Papers
Read Before the Kansas Commandery of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of
the United States,
(Kansas City, KS, 1906), 301.
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