Thursday, June 27, 2019

Chaos, Confusion, and Casualties


Once again, I have drifted off into miniature wargaming because I enjoy it and because it actually facilitates interpreting actual historical events. This year, I am finally getting back into wargaming with HMGS East. My grandson and I are attending Fall-In at the Valley Forge Convention Center where I will be delivering two presentations at the War College on Friday and Saturday at 10:00 a.m., entitled “Chaos, Confusion, and Casualties: Simulating a Civil War Battle in 54mm.

The gaming area will have 2 set up tables for the opposing armies and a gaming area 12 feet by 5 feet. Each side will have three brigades comprised of 5 regiments apiece with the sizes of the regiments ranging from 300 to 800 men, and two - 3 artillery section commanders.

The idea is for each player to be responsible for his/her own area of the field and work with the artillerists to gain domination of the adjoining fields if they are occupied by hostile forces.

The players will introduce their troops to their randomly plotted areas of the field within the first three – four turns and they are not required to commit their entire brigades at the same time.

The sequence is rather simple: Movement which will be simultaneous and then Firing which will generate smoke. Level playing fields might or might not exist.  Some areas of entry are going to be difficult to navigate.

Visibility on the field might be limited based upon terrain features like walls, buildings, smoke and high terrain.

When the fighting breaks out the defenders have to decide if they will fire or flee. Did the Rebels announce their advance with their famous, blood curdling yell? How did the Yankees react to it? In the smoke and noise did the one side see the other flank them. In the retreat or panic did a unit collide with a friendly unit or a hostile unit? If so did what kind of reaction did that generate? During the melee did your brigadier find himself caught in the crossfire? Did the skirmishers pop away at the officers and hit them? If so, how did the affected regiment react?

The idea is to create a noisy, fun game with unexpected twists in it and then to relate it to what happened in a real engagement. This is a game where officers and generals have limited control once the shooting starts, where artillery can accidentally “drop short” or overshoot. Where there might be too many troops in the area to adequately maneuver them.

In designing this I reflected a great deal about the Battle of Antietam, where Confederates on the Smoketown Road got lost in the smoke and ended up in the East Woods. Where General Joseph Mansfield rode into the Woods and mistakenly thought the 10th Maine was firing into their own men. Where the 19th Indian and the 7th Wisconsin, having gotten lost on what later became Confederate Avenue got lost and ended up coming up through the West Woods and fired into the Confederates along the Hagerstown Pike while inadvertently hitting their own men on the opposite side of the road. 
The game promises to be surprising and quick moving.
Once again, positive and constructive comments are always welcome.

The following  photograph  illustrates a solitaire version of one phase of a practice battle.

A federal regiment in the road in the background has fires into the Confederate flank while a small rebel battalion, unobserved in the smoke, heads toward the Yankee left flank this side of the stonewall.

Tuesday, June 18, 2019

Thoughts on the Reason "Why."


One of the hardest things to do is not to interpret the past through our contemporary lenses. I do not know how many times visitors at Antietam marvel how those men, in their linear formations, at the Sunken Road (Bloody Lane) and the Cornfield, at the Sunken Road (Bloody Lane) and the Cornfield. Many of them, whether veterans or “green” troops had experienced death at home. They were accustomed to holding wakes for the dead in their homes. They had seen family members die and knew the chilling sound of the “death rattle.” For the city dwellers, it was just as common. All one has to do is read Jacob A. Riis, The Making of an American or How the Other Half Lives to understand how hard life really was for the working class. Being exposed to tragedy at an early age shapes how an individual deals with dying. In a way, it almost has to be experienced to understand it.

 In a great many battles, atmospheric conditions like wind, rain, fog, lightning and geographic features like tall grass, ridges, swales, wood lots, crop fields, fence rows, and stone walls affected the line of sight. At Antietam, for instance, the ground fog and the high humidity kept the smoke of the battle during the morning low to the ground. The soldiers, very often were firing at shadows and muzzle flashes, often unsure if whether they were hitting friend or foe.

Lack of frequent and/or proper musketry or rifle practice affected the ability of many soldiers to hit what they were pointing at. In the chaos and total bedlam of battle all incoming rounds were considered hostile and needed to be suppressed. That has never changed in warfare.

They marched in tight formations because the needed to gain fire superiority over their opponents to drive them from the field. That principle is still followed today. With muzzle loading weapons they had to stay in formations to accomplish that.

The evidence indicates that the men, given the opportunity to take cover, would and did unless it was physically impossible to do so. At the Cornfield the 2nd and 6th Wisconsin laid down behind the fence on the southern edge of the Cornfield. Lawton’s Brigade, which they attacked, had laid in the tall grass south of the Cornfield to avoid being seen and rose up to fire when the Westerners came into close range. The Confederates in the Bloody Lane laid on the northern bank behind the fence which they had torn down to make cover as did the third Union line to assault their position.

Another thing to consider is that men did desert, did “show the white feather,” while others did what they had to do, knowing they might not live through the fight. The problem with the Civil War is that over the decades which followed it has, as far as the general public is concerned, been sanitized and romanticized much like we seem to be doing with the “Greatest Generation.”  I often think we say “Thank you,” too much, to the point that it loses its meaning. I think we use the word “Hero” too much. In the eyes of so many of the veterans – at least the ones I have known – the heroes did not come home. I am trying to say that we need to understand that horrible, stupid things happen in the cauldron of battle which cannot not be logically explained. They happened because they happened and the reason “why” never entered the equation.


Thursday, June 6, 2019

Making the Connections


Writing is a time consuming and, at times, a tedious process. I often get asked how my next project is coming and my general response is “Slow.” I might never finish this Gettysburg project but then, that is OK. Over the past weeks, I have digressed into wargaming. I have taken time to go shooting with my 50 cal. Hawken percussion rifle and I have been conducting tours. The entire time have been thinking. Yesterday, June 5, I had the privilege of touring Antietam with a very well read and thoughtful couple from Baltimore, Maryland while taking two of our future guides training tour. What a tremendous learning experience!

That tour, in conjunction with adaptations to the Herbst Woods scenario I have published on this blog, produced this entry. At my age, I have to write down my fleeting thoughts because they are “fleeting,” very fleeting, kind of like mental purging. It started when my colleague and I were playing the Herbst Woods game. Several things occurred to us as he discussed the mechanics of the game.

1.      It was fast! Constantly changing from turn to turn.

2.      The rugged terrain mucked up everything.

3.      The smoke and woods obscured the troops’ vision and made target identification difficult.

4.      The Confederates exposed their intention to charge by delivering the “Rebel yell.”

5.      The Confederate artillery fired blindly into the chaos with occasional “drop shorts.”

6.      Neither side had any idea what was occurring on their flanks.

The more we discussed it, the more we thought about how confusing it would be if we could expand the game into several consecutive games played on separate tables, each representing the flanks and/or the front, and rear of the fields as the action shifted from one part of the field to the other. Each table would be a battle within a battle and have its own separate sets of players.

After he left, I proceeded to set up three tables using Heroscape to create the action along McPherson’s ridge south of the Chambersburg Pike. I used construction insulation panels to create the hills then built the Heroscape terrain on top of them. The results of which you see below.
Herbst Woods, 26th North Carolina v. Iron Brigade
South of Herbst Woods, Right of Pettigrew's Brigade
North of Herbst Woods, Brockenbrough's Brigade


So how does all of this relate to battlefield interpretation and writing my new book on Gettysburg? Everything! Absolutely everything!

1.      Battlefields are not flat. Ridges, gullies, swales, woodlots, orchards, unharvested crops break up the line of sight.

2.      Streams, hills, marshes, rock outcroppings, buildings and fences impede, stall, or slowdown the lines of advance.

3.      Poor visibility due to excessive haze, caused by high humidity, smoke, cloud cover, fog make it difficult to see who is where.

4.      The nature of combat itself and the soldier’s tendency to develop tunnel vision often makes it impossible to see what is occurring on the flanks, sometime within a matter of feet.

5.      All of those factors can lead to combat situations where it becomes up close and way too personal. That is what happened at Antietam and at Herbst Woods. The following references refer to Antietam but that are applicable to any Civil War Battlefield.

Some historians have estimated that the average Civil War small arms fire occurred at about 200 yards. That was not the case at Antietam. Ground fog, the Miller Cornfield, the fields of high mow grass and the rolling terrain, coupled with the high humidity kept the smoke low to the ground during the morning fight created a situation where the opposing forces literally opened fire upon each other at ranges varying from 30 yards to literally 10 feet. There being hardly any breeze on that part of the field that morning, the smoke did not dissipate. (The same thing happened to the 2nd Wisconsin as it ascended the eastern side of McPherson’s Ridge near Herbst Woods, The Tennesseans lay along the ledge to the west in a tall wheat field. They could only see the Federal flag above the fence on the crest to their front and caught the Wisconsiners in a volley which took out about 30% of their line.)

At the Cornfield, when the 2nd and 6th Wisconsin regiments knocked the fence down on the top of the hill on the southern face of the field and started to fire prone, they fired blindly through the mow grass along their front at ground level. They could not see any of the action going on around them because of the ground cover, the abrupt drop of the ridge on their immediate left and the ground fog obscuring their vision to the left front (southeast).

Consequently, several actions occurred independently and simultaneously in their immediate vicinity. Officers could not see their flanks, they could only control; what occurred within their very limited line of sight. Strategy had very little to do with how the battle played out once the two sides made contact.

Miniature wargaming in 54mm an regimental level can reflect that chaos. Picture a game with three separate playing field, each being run independently of the other, yet part of the same battle. Confederate commanders can order their men not to cheer while advancing but that can be negated by a simple die roll. Using a d3 (3-sided die) or a renumbered d6 using a permanent marker a player in smoke can roll it to determine how many spaces a regiment can see, which limits the ability to respond to an assault.

Prone regiments can fire blindly through tall grass fields regardless of who is in front with a reduced effectiveness of fire while gaining some protection from incoming fire. Troops may also fire from one table to the next. All the while they may be getting hit by both hostile and “friendly” artillery fire.
The left of the 19th Indiana fires into the left flank of the 11th North Carolina

Battlefield interpretation, miniature wargaming, and wring about an action are all interrelated. Wargaming on a small unit tactical level puts the gamer on the field. Walking the field helps the gamer understand the importance of line of sight and command control. Walking the field and gaming help the historians visualize what occurred on the field and helps with describing as clearly as possible the event as it actually occurred. What strikes our visitors the most about Antietam is how the ground changes so quickly and therefore affects their understanding of the battle. Every time I go out on the field, I learn something new and though provoking.

Thank you again for your time and patience. As always, I appreciate any and all constructive observations and comments.

In response to Stew, this is the proposed game chart. Player A is the one who wins the initiative.

The turn involves action and reaction. 

Friday, May 31, 2019

Turn 2 Wargaming Herbst Woods, July 1, 1863


I am shooting the final turn of this small scenario this week. There are five turns. The idea is to produce a sample game which the readers can download to create their own rules set. The beauty of miniature wargaming is that the players tweak the rules to meet the specific needs of their game. It is comparable to doing historical research where new information changes the original narrative.

Over the following month of so, I will be blogging in a more traditional manner by interrupting the flow of the game with "normal commentaries as well. I genuinely appreciate your patience in this process. My mind doe snot fire in any particular sequence at times and I want to provide the audience with a variety of commentaries.

Turn 2 Confederate initiative.









The 6d represent the Adjusted Range. The Confederate are red and the Federal white. 
Add caption


Close up of calculating officer casualties. Officer casualties are checked when a piece is lost.






The two wings did not collide therefore the right wing does not have to roll for a panic check.




Once again, thank you for reviewing this long entry. Your thoughtful and constructive observations and comments are always welcome.



Wednesday, May 22, 2019

Wargaming Herbst Woods Turn 1

What follows is photographic presentation of  my game rules "By the Left Flank!" This is Turn One. I figured it would be easier to introduce the rules as the game is played than in the traditional rule book format. As always, constructive questions and observations are always welcome. This game can be played solo or by two or more players at this small scale.





Add caption

The measuring sticks are made from wooden window blind slats.

My apologies for the typing error.


















Turn 2 follows next week. I thank you for your patience because I am learning the photo editing as I go along. Again, I thoroughly appreciate your observations and comments.








Wednesday, May 15, 2019

Miniature Wargaming Herbst Woods in 54mm





At the request of a colleague and fellow miniature wargamer, I decided to recreate Herbst Woods at Gettysburg, July , 1863 for our next game. Using the excellent base maps which cartographer Stephen Stanley generated for my newest Gettysburg project, I developed an Heroscape version of the battlefield.

The Trees and fences are Marx reproductions. Unless otherwise noted, the figures are by Conte. 
Each hex represents 50 feet of terrain and each infantry piece, officers excepted, represent 50 men in two ranks with file closers. The two Confederate regiments are the 26th North Carolina and the 11th North Carolina. The Iron Brigade from left to right are the 19th Indiana. 24th Michigan, 17th Wisconsin, and 2nd Wisconsin. Interestingly enough, the length of the regimental lines are to scale according to the descriptions left by the veterans of the four regiments. Based upon the frontages and the actual western face of the woods, the 2nd Wisconsin would have to have faced north to secure the brigade’s right flank and still be covered by the woods.



The ravines are steeper in the model than on the contour map because it was physically impossible to reproduce them exactly with the Heroscape pieces The distinct ridgelines, however is to scale with the Stanley maps for the distance between each ridge.

The creek hexes represent the creek bans on both sides. It was not possible to make it to scale using Heroscape.



Movement can be anywhere from 1 – 9 inches (50-450 feet), which reflect lock step to the double quick. The flexibility of the rate allows the players to deduct distance from each move for ascending and descending contours, jumping of wading the creek and slogging through the marshy creek bottoms. (Gettysburg gets very soggy.) 
A deduction of 1 inch applies per layer of the Heroscape.







Over the next several blogs I intend to present my informal rules set, By the Left Flank! In stages. This is the introduction to the basics of the scale for movement and organization. Future posts will address Turn Sequence, Firing, Hand to Hand Combat, Casualty Recording, Skirmishers, Role of Officers. I intend to explain the game through annotated photographs as I play the game solo.

I thank you for your patience with this experiment and genuinely encourage constructive questions and observations.

Wednesday, May 8, 2019

"Do This Mean What I Think It Do?"


I borrowed this title from John Wayne’s “The Alamo” where two of the wounded character actors are facing imminent death at the hands of two soldados and the one turns to the other and says “Does this mean what I think it do?” “It do,” his comrade replies. The scene, I believe, truthfully relates to a dilemma the historian encounters when an evidence trail leads to an unanticipated and uncomfortable conclusion. There is no easy way to deal with the problem I have encountered other than to lay out the evidence and let the proverbial “chips fall where they may.”
On November 18. 1863 Col. William W. Robinson, 7th Wisconsin, penned his after-action report of the battle of Gettysburg, and since then it has become one of the foundational accounts of the heroic stand of the I Corps on July 1, 1863. However, since then, a great many more primary accounts have surfaced through the work of renowned Iron Brigade historian, Lance Herdegen. Using those accounts and those of other participants in the action at Herbst Woods has led me to draw conclusions which question the veracity of Robinson’s report.
1.      Robinson said the 7th Wisconsin arrived near Gettysburg about 10:00 a.m.
   His lieutenant colonel, John B. Callis in a letter to battle historian. John B. Bachelder wrote that the colonel “went to the rear” about 9:00 am. or later in the afternoon when he heard of General Solomon Meredith’s wounding. I think the evidence shows he left eh column in the morning and did not show up until after Meredith left the field.

2.      Robinson writes, “We had not halted to load, and no orders had been received to do so…I. however, gave the order to load during the movement,,,so that no time was lost by this omission.”
   At the first reunion of the 19th Indiana in1871 at  Cambridge City, Indiana, Capt. Hollon Richardson, senior staff officer of the Iron Brigade, and Meredith’s son-in-law stated, “ By the order of Gen. Meredith, I directed the several Colonels in their order of columns to move forward into line and directed them to load as they came into line.”
(As a side note, Richardson married the colonel’s daughter secretly on May 9, 1862 which created bad blood between the two until 1864.)
   Two enlisted men in the 7th Wisconsin clearly indicated they went into action with loaded weapons.
3.      Robinson deployed his regiment along the fence on the crest of McPherson ridge with his right flank anchored on the southeast corner of Herbst Woods while the 2nd Wisconsin entered the woods to his right front. He said that Capt. Craig Wadsworth rode up to him from the right (north) and the colonel asked him to identify what troops ere hidden in the smoke to his front. Robinson was not sure if it was Confederates or the left of the 2nd Wisconsin. Wadsworth pointed to a Confederate battle flag jutting above the smoke to the left front, some 200 yards away.
   Lieutenant Colonel John B. Callis and Maj. Mark Finnicum (7th Wisconsin) both said otherwise. Callis said the regiment was moving right in front when it was his by the first volley which struck the 2nd Wisconsin to his front. Both he and the major recalled both regiments getting hit by that fir, which knocked down a “many of our men.” (Finnicum sent a report to the governor of Wisconsin on July 24, 1863.)
   Callis was wounded slightly and his horse died in that volley. He hurriedly organized his men into line, ordered them to fix bayonets and charge. Just as they did so Wadsworth, riding in from the north, where he had left the slain Gen. John F. Reynolds, ordered them to stop but to no avail.
4.      Robinson waited for the 19th Indiana and the 24th Michigan to come up on his left before the regiments fired and charged.
   In Ltc. William W. Dudley’s “The Iron Brigade at Gettysburg,” (1879) the only brigade level report of the brigade in that battle stated, “The 7th Wisconsin, and the following regiments were hurried up and, forming line of battle from line of march, launched upon the enemy without alignment, thus in effect charging en echelon.” (Dudley commanded the 19th Indiana and lost a leg at Gettysburg.)
   This matches Richardson’s account of delivering the order to form line by taking the order from colonel to colonel and it also explains why no Confederates saw a massive Federal line to their front.
5.      Colonel Robinson said that after the brigade overran Archer’s Confederate brigade that General Meredith personally ordered his to cross to the eastern side of Willoughby Run and he fell into the brigade line. He places the 7th Wisconsin on the right of the line with the 2nd Wisconsin to its left.
   Dudley, the historian of the 24th Michigan, Callis and Sgt. Cornelius Wheeler (2nd Wisconsin) places the brigade order from south to north as: 19th Indiana, 24th Michigan, 7th Wisconsin, 2nd Wisconsin, with the 2nd facing north, inside the wood line, at a right angle to the 7th Wisconsin.
6.      At the time of the 3:00 p.m. attack of Heth’s Division against Herbst Woods, Robinson asserts, “Captain Richardson brought me the order to retire to Seminary Ridge. I retired by the right of companies to the rear…”
   Major Finnicum in his July 24 letter to the governor penned. “At this time a staff officer came to Col. Robinson, with orders to fall back with the 7th Regt. and form a new line of battle.”
   Richardson confirms this in part. After witnessing Dudley’s and Genera; Meredith’s wounding, “I had but time to say God bless and preserve you, when I dashed on to make our third stand. After giving the enemy a good round volley we moved back by right of company to the rear.” He further says the regiment turned about three times in retreat to deliver shots at the enemy.
   John B. Callis confirms this but adds, “This was about 3 o’clock in the afternoon when I received a line from Gen. Meredith saying, ‘I am hurt and cannot get to you, take command of the brigade and get out of that little end of a V as best you can.” He proceeded to order the regiment to retreat by “right of companies to the rear,” and., as noted by Richardson, fell back to face about and return fired several times.
   If Richardson was senior officer, he should have gotten brigade command but he did not, according to his own report, get command until later in the evening when what was left of the brigade reached Cemetery Hill.
   On July 14, 1863, the brigade’s division commander, General James Wadsworth, wrote Governor Alexander W. Randall (Wisconsin), the following: In the battle of Gettysburg, as senior staff officer of the Brigade, a large and unusual amount of responsibility devolved upon him [Hollon Richardson], amounting at times to the command of the brigade. His conduct on this as on other occasions of severe trial, was in highest degree meritorious.”
   It is interesting to note that 10 days later Major Finnicum, and not acting brigade commander, Colonel Robinson, wrote a letter to the governor in which he cites Robinson as being on the field at the commencement of the retreat and mentions the wounding of John B. Callis. (Finnicum fought in the ranks of Company E like an enlisted man and was not behind the regiment as he should have been. No apparent command control existed in the brigade at this time.)
   On August 13, 1863 General Lysander Cutler, commanding the 2nd Brigade, Wadsworth’s brigade, wrote to former governor Edward Solomon, “Sir: I desire to recommend to your especial consideration, Captain Hollon Richardson, of the 7th Wisconsin Volunteers…”on the bloody field of Gettysburg, where he manifested the utmost coolness and bravery , entitle him to the especial consideration of the Executive of the State he has so much honored. At Gettysburg he virtually commanded the brigade for a portion of the day. It cannot be known how many lives he saved by the manner in which he brought off the troops from that field…when there seemed to be no one else to give orders, most of the field officers having been killed or wounded.”
   It is interesting that Cutler felt compelled to write the former governor (presumably to tell the current governor) to reinforce what his division commander had already stated.
   Callis, who was on foot and in full retreat with his men never had the opportunity to command the brigade. He was shot down while trying to get the Federal artillery from shredding their own line with canister.
7.      Robinson’s account of the retreat through town is very accurate. He apparently came upon what was left of the regiment at the rail barricade in the low ground west of Seminary Ridge. Finnicum said he came upon seven of the regiment’s companies where the colonel had rallied the men in “Splendid style.”
8.      Robinson interestingly writes that during the retreat from the Seminary to the town, I met with the heaviest losses from the regiment during the day.” Had he been on the field during the first volley and during the retreat through Herbst Woods, he would not have written that. It was the largest number of losses sustained while he was with the regiment. Conclusion: Robinson wrote his report based upon the testimony of the few officers and men who survived the morning and early afternoon fight. He was not with the regiment until it retired to Seminary Ridge. I do not know why he was not with the regiment or the brigade until that time, I can only suppose that he had fallen ill in the excessive heat and humidity. He was not a coward by any means but he was not a witness to the fight until the retreat through town.