The Wounding of General Mansfield (Part 3)

The next published account of the action on September 17 appeared in 1872 in John Mead Gould, History of the First-Tenth-Twenty-ninth Maine Regiment in the Service of the United States From May 3, 1862, to June 21, 1866. He spent 33 pages describing the regiment’s role in the battle including in depth descriptions of the tactical deployment of the 10^th Maine on company level. Without question, this is among one of the most comprehensive narratives of any regiment upon the field that day. He undoubtedly relied upon other participants’ recollections to create this account. I have listed below the new material with commentary as well as other items mentioned in previous sources.[1]

1)      Slept quietly until about 5:00 a.m. when a sharp rattle of musketry brings us to our feet. (232). [Agrees with the Journal, however, most accounts, including Gould’s memo, say that artillery fire at 5:30 a.m. awakened them.]

2)      No breakfast, broke [rifle] stacks and waited for orders. (233)

3)      Soon come to a post and rail fence and tear it down to move toward firing. (233) [South. Agree with memo and Journal.]

4)    Pass through Best’s Battery. [Capt. Clermont Best was the XII Corps, chief of artillery. His old battery, the 4^th Maine Battery was across the creek on a hill south of the Pry house, and not on the field. The regiment passed Pennsylvania Light, Battery E, Cpt Joseph M. Knap, commanding which was posted along their line of march.]

5)      We are ordered to lie down under a little knoll which sheltered us from artillery for an hour “by the watch.” (233) [This is immediately east of Joseph Poffenberger’s house and is in agreement with the Journal.]

6)      General Mansfield, here, remarked very quietly to Col. [George L.] Beal, “We are in reserve to-day, sir.” “and every man heard it or says he did.” (233) [The general apparently spoke louder than he intended because of the burst shells behind the line.]

7)      Occasionally, we rose up to see what was going on. Out of the woods, [Samuel Poffenberger’s] to the left from came swarms of wounded and skulks. (234)

8)      We all saw Mansfield ride about the field in his new untarnished uniform. “His long silvery hair flowing out behind him, and we all loved him.” (235)

9)      The general was on a knoll in our front, watching the battle until the artillery fire shifted and he rode rapidly toward his troops and set them in motion. (235) [This agrees with the Journal, 194.]

10)   We started south but the general ordered a “left oblique” but we did not gain enough distance, The general still motioned us to the left. We sidled into a small cornfield where Colonel Beal ordered “Left flank!” We found our places and moved into the plowed field east of a road [Smoketown Road]. (235) [In agreement with the Journal, 194.]

11)   [While sidling into the small cornfield] “We saw in the open field away through the woods a group of forty or fifty men around the stars and stripes, quite near an abandoned gun or limber. They were falling to the rear inch by inch, the color sergeant waving his flag , and the officers shouting and beckoning for the men who had gone to the rear to return, which some of them did.” Some of us supposed it might have been the enemy trying “to steal upon us without being fired at.” (238) [He refers to this in the Journal, 194. Also see the citation in this footnote to reference Pvt. Frank Holsinger (Company F, 8th Pennsylvania Reserves), who witnessed this incident.][2]

12)   “It was almost exactly 7.30 o’clock, by my watch, when we went through the gap in the fences of this road.” (235- 236) [The actual time was 7:20 a.m., Gould’s watch being 5 – 10 minutes fast. This agrees with his diary memo.]

13)   We see Asst. Surgeon Leland [Error: Albert A. Kendall], 12^th Massachusetts, being carried off, mortally wounded when Gen. [Joseph] Hooker [I Corps, commanding] rode up and asked our officers what regiment we were. He said the rebs were breaking through his lines and,”You must hold those woods!”(236)  [East Woods. Not in the Journal.]

14)   We are a few rods into the plowed field when we are ordered “Right flank!” (236)

15)   We are in column of division [2 company front] advancing toward the east and Mansfield refuses to allow us to deploy in line of battle. He tells Col. Beal we could be handled better en masse. (236)

16)   A few stray bullets whizz by as we cross the road. (236)

17)   We march into a gentle swale and up when we see the woods again. (236) [This indicates that the plowed field Gould mentions was the ground immediately north of the grass field in front of the East Woods and that he might have erred in referring the grass field as a plowed one.]

18)   Once we see the woods, the lead companies came under fire from a Confederate skirmish line at the fence separating the field from the woods. Their fire fell short or went over us.  Most of us paid no attention to it. (236) [In the Journal this is where he said Pvt. McGinty was killed. They were advancing against the 21^st Georgia – about 175 offices and men – under the command of Capt. James Cooper Nisbet (Company H).]

19)   “We saw no union troops except one of the new Penn. Regiments, the 128^th [125^th] which was on the right [west] side of the road, also advancing in mass [sic].” (236) [The 125^th was behind the 10^th Maine during the advance and was in “column of company, closed en masse.”]

20)   “We were  under fire and advancing at a brisk walk closed in mass [sic], that is ten ranks deep (or fifteen ranks, counting file closers). We were almost as good a target as a barn.” (237) [In this formation, the column was about 52 feet wide, a very compact target.]

21)   We were losing men at every step (about 1/6 of our total losses) and Colonel Beal, without orders, ordered us to deploy in line of battle at the double-quick. (237) [The regiment was descending into a basin. Its northern edge measures 629 feet west to east. However a southwesterly running ridge narrows the approach to 180 feet at its southern side. On the western edge of the field. The Smoketown Road follows another, lower ridge to the northern face of the woods. In descending into the low ground, the road and the ledge constricted the regimental front and affected its deployment.]

22)   The rebels retired as we advanced and when we reach the fence, Company F and part of Company C were refused, sheltering behind the ledge on the left. (237)

23)   The right of the line went over the fence into the woods, many ahead of the colors and may have been hit by our own men. (237) [In his Mansfield piece written in the 1890’s Gould mentions that the regiment formed a left quarter wheel, facing southeast.]

24)    The 10^th Maine was armed with the Johnston and Dow Patent Cartridge – a combustible round which did not have to be torn open to fire. The regiment could fire faster than the Confederates. (239)

25)   Just before our first fie the colonel’s horse was shot in the head. The animal became unmanageable, reeled around and forced the colonel to dismount. He was shot through both legs the second he dismounted. (240) [Vivid description in the Journal, 194.]   

26)   The horse kicked Lt. Fillebrown in the chest and stomach [groin] and Major [Charles] Walker who had been sick for a month [diarrhea] hobbled along behind us but in effect we had no one in command. This occurred before the regiment had fired two rounds. (240) [This occurred within a matter of a minute.]

27)   Mansfield beckoned us from Croasdale Knoll to cease fire but the few who noticed him did not know what his motions meant. (240)

28)   He rode down the hill from [behind] the 128^th Pennsylvania [125^th] and quickly passed through the right of the line [Company H] passing across H, A, K, E, I G, D, he yelled at them to cease fire. He halted at C [south of the end of the ledge] where Sergt. [Henry A.] Burnham and Capt. [William P.] Jordan [both Company C] asking him to see their gray coats and that they were aiming at him. (240)

29)   “Yes, yes, you are right,” Mansfield replied when he was hit. (240) [Some question exists as to how accurately Jordan recorded this event and whether or not Mansfield really recognized the men across from him were Confederates.]

30)   The general turned and attempted to put his horse over the rails and failed to do so. He dismounted and a gust of wind blew his coat open and we saw that he was wounded in the body. (240) [Note that the nonexistent wind blew open the general’s coat. This is at variance with the letter to Mrs. Mansfield and with the Journal, 194.]

31)   “Sergt. Joe Merrill [Company F], Storer Knight [Company D] and I took the General to the rear, assisted for a while by a negro cook of Hooker’s corps.” (240-241) [He does not mention waiting awhile for help to evacuate the general but implies it was immediate. He then goes on to describe the fighting of the regiment after he put the general in an ambulance near Sam Poffenberger’s Woods.] (241)

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[1] Gould, History of the 1^st-10th-29^th Maine, (Portland, ME, 1872), 232 – 261. The footnotes in this section will be cited in parenthesis at the end of each statement.

[2] Frank Holsinger, How Does One Feel Under Fire?,” War Talks in Kansas. A Series of Papers Read Before the Kansas Commandery of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, (Kansas City, KS, 1906), 301. 

The Wounding of General Mansfield (part 2)

The following blogs are going to consist of details from all of the accounts I have gathered so far regarding John M. Gould’s writings about Antietam. They are being presented in with my notations and commentaries in brackets and, undoubtedly you will see material from the first blog among these entries but they are necessary. When completed you will have as detailed analysis of what happened that fateful day on September 17, 1862. The entries are necessarily longer than in most blogs and I am attempting to insert footnotes for the first time. Your patience is appreciated.

John Mead Gould (Acting Adjutant, 10^th Maine Volunteer Infantry) devoted the better part of his postwar life trying to prove that Brig. Gen. Joseph K. F. Mansfield, XII Corps commander, received his mortal wound in front of the 10^th Maine. He correctly began his 1896 publication, Joseph K. F. Mansfield Brigadier General of the U. S. Army, A Narrative of Events Connected With His Mortal Wounding at Antietam, Sharpsburg , Maryland, September 17, 1862, in the introductory paragraph:

“It was bad enough and sad enough that Gen. Mansfield should be mortally wounded once, but to be wounded six, seven or eight times in as many locations is too much of a story to let stand unchallenged.”[1]

            His accompanying map identified five of the alleged locations. Locations “A”, “B”, and “E” are unquestionably incorrect. B is too far west. The general stayed with the left of his corps and was nowhere near the David R. Miller Farm. “E” is also incorrect. In an 1893 account in the National Tribune by Pvt. John H. Keatley (Company A, 125^th Pennsylvania) erroneously said the general fell near the Hagerstown Pike at point “E”. Again, no evidence indicates Mansfield ever went beyond the East Woods.[2] 

I took the cluttered, hard to read Gould Map and transferred the information to the 1963 James D. Bowlby Map, which is based upon the Carman-Cope Maps. I have approached this conundrum by correlating and analyzing as many primary sources I could find to locate where they saw the general on the field.

Traditionally, Adj. John M. Gould’s account, mostly through his personal exertions and influence has become the official accounting of Mansfield’s wounding and death at the exclusion of those rendered by the 125^th Pennsylvania. Experience in research, over the intervening 30 years between the release of my Antietam: the Soldiers ’ Battle in 1989, has taught me that, as a rule, no two individuals will recall see the same incident identically. While some psychologists believe that perception is reality what the individual actually experienced might differ somewhat from what he believed happened.

By examining John M. Gould’s personal writings on the incident I believe I can illustrate how the need to make the experience complete an individual will not only recall more details of the event over time but will fill in the voids with the recollections of other witnesses.

The following is a copy of Gould’s memo, “Diary kept during day.” The brackets are his notes written in 1890 and initialed by him. This entry concerns the day of the battle, September 17, 1862.[3]

(5:30 up [this I presume is a later entry in the History I sat “about 5” JMG 1890]

6.10 Halted at cornfield & tore down a nice rail fence

6.30 Advance past Best’s battery

7.30 Going through the corn (this was the actual advance 5 minutes after we were firing)

8.30 Went back to the fight

(Has previously taken Gen. Mansfield to rear & helped Sergt Geo A Smith a short distance. Finding the regt. gone I got back to the battlefield I helped off wound[ed])

12 ate dinner

12.25 getting list of casualties

Apparently my watch was 5 – 10 minutes fast July 1892

As early as December 2, 1862, he wrote Mrs. General Mansfield the following:

“Passing in front of our line and nearer to the enemy, he attempted to ride over the rail fence which separated a lane [Smoketown Road, JMP] from the ploughed land where most of our regiment were posted. The horse would not jump it, and the General dismounting led him over it, when a gust of wind blew aside his coat, and I discovered his whole front was covered with blood. I ran to him and asked if he was hurt badly, “Yes,’ he said, ‘Yes – I shall not live – I am shot by one of our own men.’”[4]

A few items stand out in this contemporary account. a) Mansfield attempted cross the Smoketown Road into the lower ground northeast of the East Woods over the downed fence while mounted.  b) An unexpected gust of wind blew open his coat and revealed his front covered in blood. c) He knew he was dying. d) he said one of his own men shot him.

None of those specifics appear in the memo, however they are the first mention of the severity of the general’s wound and how he received it. This account also changed over time.

From carefully reading his published journals and diary it is obvious that he inserted information months, if not decades later, as it returned to his memory or as others “refreshed” his recollections with their own stories. Rather than quote his journal verbatim, I have listed the embellished or appended material.[5]

1)      He noted the weather as overcast with a persistent breeze. [The majority of participants in the morning fight, who mention the weather, describe it at muggy, with a bright blue sky, thick ground fog, and no breeze and hot. Gould is the only one I have seen which describes it as “not a warm day.”]

2)      Awakened at 5:30 a.m.  Firing coming from [the south].  [He references the fighting during the late afternoon and early evening of September 16 and with the artillery fire opening from the Confederate lines at first light: 5:30 – 5:45 a.m.]

3)      Mansfield ordered the men to tear down a fence and go toward the right of the army. [west]    

4)      We tear down a magnificent fence at a cornfield and halt. [On the Carman-Cope Maps it appears south of the Middlekauf farm lane and immediately west of the Smoketown Road.]

5)      From here the regiment moved south under a small hill and lay down to avoid artillery fire. They lay here a while [Gould’s 1896 map marks the time in this field as 6.20 and shows a stone pile bordering the Samuel Poffenberger (Smoketown) Woods. The spot is at the East- South bend of the farm lane which runs through the East Woods]

6)      As they lay there, Mansfield rode to the right [front] and observed the battle until a shell drove him from the spot. [Gould identifies this spot with a “W” and placed it at the northwest corner of the northern face of the East Woods. From that vantage point he could have seen the Confederate guns east of the Dunker Church above the surrounding ground fog.

7)      “He was everywhere and took command in person of everything he wanted moved.” [Mansfield, having assumed XII Corps command on September 15, did not have an adequate staff for a corps. Captain Clarence H. Dyer his A.A.G., traveled with the general from Washington, D.C. General George B. McClellan detached Capt. James W. “Toney” Forsyth from his staff to serve as Mansfield’s aide-de-camp, and Brig. Gen. Samuel Crawford gave the general his own aide-de-camp, 1^st Lt. Edward L. Witman (Company D, 46^th Pennsylvania) to serve as an aide. None were with Mansfield when he was shot because he had them scattered all over the field delivering orders and gathering intelligence.][6]

8)      Move into a cornfield [10 acre cornfield] and flank left across a small lane [Smoketown Road] into a ploughed field. [The Carman Maps show it as a grass field.]

9)      The regiment got pretty mixed up in a few minutes because of contradictory orders to “left oblique” “and left face.”

10)   Under fire the regt. advances across ploughed ground, John McGinty (Company B) shot dead through the head here.

11)   Reached a rail fence over which a few men jumped and others sheltered behind and fired through.

12)   Mansfield and [Samuel] Crawford [on Croasdale Knoll] are on our right across the fence and in the rear of one of the new regiments.

13)   He saw us firing at what he thought were Union men and rode down in front of us yelling to “cease firing.”

14)   With great difficulty he succeeded in making himself heard.

15)   “The officers were running around the crowd trying to stop the men who knew well the character of the men in front.”

16)   On reaching the fence I had a chance to at things beyond the 10^th Maine. The woods were large trees, no underbrush. [Later testimony said there were logs and piles of cord wood among the trees.]

17)   Saw a couple of rebs jumping about among the trees doing no great mischief.

18)   To the right, new regiments of our brigade were entering the woods some distance ahead of us not bothered by the fire. [Probably the 125^th Pennsylvania.]]

19)   To our right was a brave color sergeant waving his flag and rallying about 30 men around him and more running out to him. There was a broken down caisson or deserted cannon near us. Could not distinguish which. [Probably the 8^th Pennsylvania Reserves. There is no record of a deserted gun or caisson in the vicinity.]

20)   Got the idea that the fight was going against us as [James] Rickett’s men were to the rear as also were the rebs behind them. [Gould erred here. Rickett’s Division had already been driven from the field. He is describing the retreat of Col. Albert Magilton’s Brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves from the northern side of the Miller Cornfield and the retreat of McIver Law’s Brigade from the same area. This occurred as the regiment was approaching the East Woods through the 10 acre cornfield west of the Smoketown Road and north of the East Woods. This particular entry and entry 19 belong between entries 8 and 9 at about 7:20 a.m.]

21)   Most of the fire came from the ledge across our left front, catching us in a crossfire.

22)   “I could see a rebel regiment marching by the flank toward our right threatening of course the Serg’t. with his flag.” I ran to the left of the line to get a gun. Found a fellow doing nothing and set him to work. [Not sure of this reference but it probably was the 4^th Alabama moving toward the north-south leg of the East Woods before the regiment got to the fence. Again this recollection is not in sequence with the others about the fighting in the woods.]

23)   Just then the order came to cease firing and noticing it was not being obeyed and assisted in having it obeyed. [This occurred after the regiment reached the fence.]

24)   At our first volley, the colonel’s horse jumped into the sky and the colonel left the saddle higher than the horse from the ground. [More on this in another Gould account.]

25)   Afterward they say the horse kicked [Lt.] Col. [James S.] Fillebrown in the breast and the stomach. I did not see it. [According to Nicolas Picerno, the national expert on the 10^th Maine, the horse nailed Fillebrown in the groin.]

26)   I noticed Mansfield and could not take my eyes off him. He rode in front of us beckoning us not to fire. At length, he reached the left of the line and came within 20 yards of the rebs. [More details to follow]

27)   Because his horse was hurt, he dismounted and helped the horse over the fence. He passed through our line and with his orderly went down along the ledge where I was. [[There is a ledge, running north to south along the Smoketown Road where the right of the line crossed the road to the west. Gould got the ledges mixed up when he recollected his experiences. The orderly appears to have been a straggler. H shows up in a subsequent account.]

28)   A gust of wind blew his coat skirt aside and showed me that he was wounded as well as his horse. [Note change in the account involving the wind gust and the part of the frock coat disturbed by it.]

29)   I ran to him at once and told him his horse was shot. He was trying to mount the horse.

30)   I called for a man to help me carry the general away but no one seemed to notice us  till Joe Merrill  (Co. H] came up.

31)   Dropping his gun, we took the general along. We shortly pressed 2 others and a black into service. I got a gun and put it under the general’s shoulder.

32)   At length we got quite a crowd. I let go and ran for a doctor.

33)   I came across Gen. Gordon and asked him to send an orderly for help.

34)   He was short of orderlies and ignored me.

35)   About ¾ of a mile away we encountered a surgeon and an ambulance. Feeling he was going to be cared for I left to return to the regt.

At first observation, Gould added a great deal of valuable information regarding his part in the action that day. There are numerous details which other sources support.

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[1] John Mead Gould, Joseph K. F. Mansfield Brigadier General of the U. S. Army, A Narrative of Events Connected With His Mortal Wounding at Antietam, Sharpsburg , Maryland, September 17, 1862, (Portland, ME, 1896), 3. (Hereafter cited as Gould, Joseph F. K Mansfield.)

[2] Gould, General Mansfield, 4, 24; John H. Keatley, “Ill-Timed Bravery, How One Competent General Lost His Life Through Carelessness,” National Tribune, November 16, 1893, 3…

[3] Copy memo “Diary kept during day”, Antietam Collection, John M. Gould Papers, Dartmouth college, Hanover, New Hampshire. (Hereafter cited as Gould Papers). The underscoring appears  

[4] https://john-banks.blogspot.com/2014/10/antietam-general-joseph-mansfield-death.html

[5] William B. Jordan, Jr., The Civil War Journals of John Mead Gould, 1861-1866, Baltimore, MD, 1997), 193 –195. (Hereafter cited as Jordan, Civil War Journals.)  

[6] Gould, General Mansfield, 27; Antietam Battlefield Memorial Commission, Pennsylvania at Antietam, (Harrisburg, PA, 1906), 134.

The Wounding of General Mansfield in the East Woods

Acting Adjutant John Mead Gould (10^th Maine), opened his booklet, Joseph F. K. Mansfield, Brigadier General of the U. S. Army, A Narrative of Events Connected With His Mortal Wounding at Antietam, Sharpsburg, Maryland, September 17, 1862, (Portland, ME,1895, 3), with:

“It was bad enough and sad enough that Gen. Mansfield should be mortally wounded once, but to be wounded six, seven or eight times in as many localities is too much of a story to let stand unchallenged.”

Adjutant Gould made it his life mission to prove that the General, XII Corps commander at Antietam, received his mortal wound in front of the 10^th Maine in the East Woods and that the 125^th Pennsylvania erred when they asserted that their men assisted him from his horse in the Woods west of and behind the 10^th Maine. Having re-examined the evidence, I have concluded that they both assisted the general from the field and that he, more than likely, did get mortally wounded in front of the 10^th Maine somewhere in front of the regiment’s left wing.

Reconstructing the incident requires sorting the know facts from the assumed facts. Gould never changed his story that he assisted Mansfield from the field, however, his detailed narration of the event continually evolved with each telling. I am starting with his earliest account of the incident. In The Civil War Journals of John Mead Gould, 1861-1866 (Baltimore, 1997, 194) he noted in his diary entry:

“I noticed Gen’l. Mansfield and couldn’t keep my eyes off him. He rode in front of us and beckoned us not to fire. He at length came clear to the left, within 20 yards of the rebels and his horse was hurt in the leg. He dismounted and helped him over the fence   He passed through our line and with his orderly went down along the ledge where I was. A gust of wind blew his [Mansfields’s] coat skirt aside and showed to me that he was wounded as well as his horse.” The dismounted general, apparently, still had his coat buttoned and/or was wearing his sword belt because the “gust, coming in from the south only lifted the skirt of his frock coat.

On December 2, 1862 Gould, explained, “Passing still in front of our line and nearer to the enemy, he attempted to ride over the rail fence which separated a lane [Smoketown Road] from the ploughed land where most of our regiment were posted. The horse would not jump it, and the General dismounting led him over. He passed to the rear of the Regimental line, when a gust of wind blew aside his coat, and I discovered that his whole front was covered with blood.” https://john-banks.blogspot.com/2014/10/antietam-general-joseph-mansfield-death.htm

In 1871, Gould published the History of the First-Tenth-Twenty-ninth Maine Regiment. (Portland). On p.240, he wrote:

“The rebel force in our front showed no colors. They appeared to be somewhat detached from and in advance of the main rebel line, and were about to the left of Gen. Duryee’s brigade might be supposed to have retreated. To Gen. Mansfield we appeared to be firing into Duryee’s troops, therefore he beckoned us to cease firing, and this was the very last thing we proposed to do, the few who saw him did not understand what his motions meant, and so no attention was paid to him. He now rode down the hill [Croasdale Knoll] from the 128^th Penn., and passing quickly through H, A, K, E, I, G and D, ordering them to cease firing, he halted in front of Company C at the earnest remonstrances of Capt. Jordan and Sergt. Burnham, who asked him to see the gray coats of the enemy, and pointed out particular men of them who were then aiming their rifles at us and at him! The general was convinced and remarked, “Yes, yes, you are right,” and was almost instantly hit. He turned and attempted to put his horse over the rails, but the animal had also been severely wounded and would not go over. Thereupon the General dismounted and a gust of wind blowing open his coat we saw that he was wounded in the body.”

Upset by the assertion posted November 2, 1892 in the National Tribune from a lieutenant in the 125^th Pennsylvania that two of his men helped the general from his horse, Gould fired back a lengthy reply which was published in the November 17 issue. He asserted:

“We [10^th Maine} had been firing only a few minutes before I noticed Gens. Mansfield and Crawford, with the 128^th Pa. on the knoll [Croasdale Knoll] to our right rear just described. Mansfield speedily caught sight of us, and came galloping down hill into our right company [Company H], an Orderly following. He ordered us to ‘cease firing,’ and rode from right to left through our scattered men, and compelled us to do so, saying, ‘You’re firing into our own men. Those are Hooker’s troops,’ etc. Eight and one-half only of our companies had gone over the fence. Captain William P. Jordan, ‘our bantam-cock,’ (very small but full of fight)had noticed that we were the extreme left of the corps, and had very wisely held back his division [two companies] and placed the men under the cover of the limestone ledge which is so prominent there. As Mansfield approached our left, swinging his hat at the boys and plainly greatly disturbed, Jordan ran forward and mounted a projecting spur of limestone and sang out to the General, ‘Look and see! They are aiming their rifles at you!’ etc. The General stopped, made a reply to the effect that ‘You are right,’ then turned his horse, which had been so well described by Lieut. Dunegan, and rode toward the gap in the fence near our colors. The horse would not jump over the trap-like pile of rails and litter; therefore the General dismounted to lead him. His coat blew open, and we who were near saw blood streaming down his vest. I had just left Col. Beal, who was having trouble with his horse, and I met General Mansfield in the gap in the fence.”

Finally, in 1895 from his Mansfield article, p. 15, Gould penned the following:

“We had fired only a few rounds, before some of us noticed Gens. Mansfield and Crawford, and other mounted officers, over on the Croasdale Knoll, which, with the intervening ground, was open woods, Mansfield at once came galloping down the hill and passed through the scattered men of the right companies, shouting, ‘Cease firing, you are firing into our own men!’ He rode very rapidly and fearlessly till he reached the place where our line bent to the rear (behind the fence). Captain Jordan now ran forward as far as the fence, along the top of the ridge behind which his division was sheltered, and insisted that the General ‘Look and see.’ He and Sergt. Burnham pointed out particular men of the enemy, who were not 50 yards away, that were then aiming at us and him. Doubtless, the General was wounded while talking with Jordan; at all events he was convinced, and remarked, ‘Yes, you are right.’ He then turned his horse and passed along to the lower land where the fence was down, and attempted to go through, but the horse, which also appeared to be wounded, refused to step into the trap-like mass of rails and rubbish, or to jump over. The General thereupon promptly dismounted and led the horse into Sam Poffenberger’s field.

I had noticed the General when he was with Crawford on the Croasdale Knoll, and had followed him with my eye in all his ride. Col. Beal was having a great deal of (p.16) with his horse, which was wounded and appeared to be trying to throw the Colonel and I was slow in starting from the Colonel to see what Mansfield’s gestures meant. I met him at the gap in the fence. As he dismounted his coat blew open, and I saw the blood was streaming down the right side of his vest.”

I know this is a longer blog than usual. I wanted you to examine the original evidence and to take the time to sort out the information for yourselves. In so doing, attempt to sort out what Gould did or did not see. And of those things he dis observe, which version or combination of accounts are the more accurate.

As always, your observations, questions, and comments are always welcome.  More on the mysterious locations of Mansfield on the field will appear in the next several blogs.